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This thesis explores the spatial organization and public art of Kyiv’s Independence 
Square to address broader social and political realities after the Maidan protests of 2013-14.  1
Using theories of power and ideology, this study will demonstrate how the discourse on 
public art reflects the political situation of post-revolutionary Ukraine, and how public 
engagement with urban space signals a paradigmatic shift in the developing country’s process 
of self-identification.  
In the 2013 Maidan protest, Kyiv’s public space was activated by the popular drive to 
communicate both the striving for a democratic restructuring of Ukrainian politics and 
frustration with Russia’s involvement in it. The demolition of the Lenin monument in the 
capital was followed by the subsequent process of “Leninfall” all over the country and 
eventual passing of the “decommunization” law designed to erase symbols of the USSR from 
public spaces.  The physical attack on Soviet monuments is seen as a symbolic refusal of the 2
totalitarian past which is now being reenacted through Russia’s military intervention and 
conservative imperialist politics. Yet, the decommunization law is deeply problematic in its 
reductionist strategy and monolithic representation of identity, militancy, and nationalist 
ideology. Ironically, the government’s attitude towards public art repeats the Soviet 
totalitarian strategy of using public space as a means to establish a dominant political, 
historical, and cultural narrative. Nonetheless, despite this imposition, pluralization of public 
life and culture that began with the Maidan has continued to play out within the city’s public 
1 Maidan (also known as the Euromaidan Revolution, The Ukrainian revolution of 2014 or Revolution 
of Dignity) took place in Ukraine in late November 2013—February 2014. The upheaval started as a 
wave of demonstrations and civil unrest in Ukraine, with public protests at Maidan Nezalezhnosti 
("Independence Square") in the capital city Kyiv, demanding closer European integration. 
  
2 Decommunization is a process of dismantling the legacies of the communist state establishments, 
culture, and psychology in the post-communist states.The term is most commonly applied to the 
former countries of the Eastern Bloc and the post-Soviet states to describe a number of legal and 
social changes during their periods of postcommunism. 
3 
spaces.  
The purpose of this thesis is threefold: first, to identify the Soviet ideological 
approach embedded in the spatial organization of Kyiv’s administrative center (including the 
Maidan); second, to examine artistic interventions at the site of the former Lenin monument 
Kyiv to emphasize the discrepancy between state and popular approaches to public space; 
and third, to address the decommunization law in post-Maidan Ukraine as a reenactment of 
Soviet practices. Overall, this thesis will argue that the formation of a new Ukrainian 
subjectivity based on democratic values which reached its peak during the recent revolution 
continues to manifest through the popular approach to public space as opposed to both the 
totalitarian one of the USSR and its mirror image in the post-Maidan government’s program.  
Review of Existing Literature 
 A number of statements issued by the Institute of National Memory were analyzed to 
illustrate the government’s reductionist decommunization strategy, which continues to 
manipulate national sentiment by emphasizing identity and Russia’s colonial legacy as key 
problems facing contemporary Ukraine.  ​Recent historical sources were consulted to 3
articulate the complexity of the social, political, and cultural realms that define the 
post-Soviet Ukrainian phenomenon. In “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian 
Studies” (2015) Andrii Portnov argues that in post-Soviet Ukraine, the lack of a uniform 
national public consensus on memory and language issues has often been a stabilizing factor 
in a state characterized by significant diversity.  ​ ​In “Ukraine’s Postcolonial Revolution and 4
3 Ukrainian Institute of National Memory is the central executive body operating under the Cabinet of 
Ministers of Ukraine as a special organ for the restoration and preservation of national memory of the 
Ukrainian people. Volodymyr Viatrovych, was involved in the drafting of two of four decommunization 
laws. Volodymyr Vyatrovych, “Decommunization and Academic Discussion,” ​Krytyka​, May 2016, 
accessed December 19, 2016, 
https://krytyka.com/ua/solutions/opinions/dekomunizatsiya-i-akademichna-dyskusiya​. 
 
4 Andrii Portnov, “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies,” ​​Slavic Review ​4, Vol. 
74, (Winter 2015): 726. 
4 
Counterrevolution” (2015), Ilya Gerasimov argues that the Maidan revolution was a complex 
and unprecedented phenomenon with potential for constituting a radically different type of 
society in the post-Soviet space.  According to Gerasimov,  the protest began not as an 5
opposition to Russia’s colonial heritage, but as a “creative act of self-determination” focused 
on formulating and promoting new common values. And, Yaroslav Hrytsak in “Ignorance is 
Power” (2014) argues that despite the use of national symbols during the Maidan, the 
protesters’ thrust was directed at transcending fixed identities and negotiating a truly 
nationwide consensus.  6
With the use of critical geography and studies of Soviet propaganda I have analyzed 
the public space of Maidan as both a part of the Soviet project to educate the masses through 
visual symbols and as a key location for popular protest activity. This study drew upon Boris 
Groys’s work, ​Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin ​(1987), in which he argues that Stalin fulfilled the 
avant-garde’s dream of organizing reality into a uniform, total work of art. The author 
addresses the USSR as simultaneously constituting both a work of art and its own author, 
constantly aiming to shape the public and private life of its citizens into a “collective body.” I 
have examined the visual implementation of ideology in the public space of Kyiv’s city 
center through the use of Groys’s perspective and archival research of documents regarding 
the construction of the Administrative center under the USSR, as well as its reconstruction 
following the protests in 1990 and 2000. 
Boris Yerofalov-Pilipchak’s ​Architecture of  Soviet Kyiv​ (2010) served as a valuable 
 
5 Ilya Gerasimov, “Ukraine’s Postcolonial Revolution and Counterrevolution,” Paper delivered at the 
conference "Revolution und Krieg: Die Ukraine in den grossen Transformationen des neuzeitlichen 
Europa / Revolution and War: Ukraine and the Great Transformation of Modern Europe," Berlin, May 
28, 2015, accessed May 24, 2017, 
https://www.academia.edu/25025782/Ukraines_Postcolonial_Revolution_and_Counterrevolution. 
 
6 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ignorance Is Power,” ​Ab Imperio 15​, no. 3 (2014): 218−28. 
5 
source of archival images and interviews with Soviet Architects. Since I was particularly 
interested to find out to what extent the official ideology was translated and implemented into 
practice—in spatial organization, architecture, and monumental art—I examined the entire 
archives of the Soviet magazine, ​Architecture and Building​ (​Архітектура і Будівництво​, 
укр.), from 1953-1990. Even though it required reading between the lines due to its 
“aesopian language,”  a critical analysis of its articles provided a comprehensive sense of 7
both the general zeitgeist and the specific political and ideological agenda architects of the 
time were obliged to follow. 
This research is also largely based on fieldwork and  oral history recordings. Besides 
observation of the dynamics of popular engagement with Kyiv’s public space before, during, 
and after the Maidan, as well as gathering visual materials and primary sources (imagery of 
vernacular and grassroots creative expression found on internet blogs and in personal 
archives of protesters, journalists, artists, etc.), I conducted a series of interviews with 
witnesses of the communist regime and the “decommunization” events that took place 
following the dissolution of the USSR, particularly those who were exposed to Soviet history 
as contemporaries or as researchers, who had worked with the locations or monuments in 
question, or who interacted with them in their daily routine. I was specifically interested in 
gathering vernacular humor regarding three Lenin monuments (Figs. 1-3) within the 
Administrative center, and in observing the popular reaction to artistic interventions at the 
site of the last Lenin monument on Bessarabska Square. For analysis of the “Social Contract” 
project, which I use to demonstrate the shift of grassroots attitude to public space, I 
interviewed the patrons, artists, and curators of the project and observed audience responses 
7 “Aesopian language” is a special type of cryptographic or allegorical writing used in literature, 
criticism, and journalism in order to circumvent censorship when such literary activity is denied 
freedom of expression. In Soviet times it was not necessarily dissident in nature, its goal was often to 
be correct in ideological terms, not in factual or discursive ones, and thus to avoid punishment. 
6 
during the period of 2016 to 2017. 
Contribution 
Through analysis of monumental art and spatial organization of Kyiv’s center, I 
introduce the Soviet concept of educating the masses and further question the efficiency of 
such an approach in the case of Maidan, which became an important location for pro 
democratic protests and the emergence of what historians call the new Ukrainian subjectivity. 
I also address the post-Maidan decommunization process and argue that despite the 
government’s insistence on erasing the symbols of the USSR, it remains essentially Soviet in 
its understanding of cultural strategies. Furthermore, I analyze recent artistic interventions at 
the site of the former Lenin monument in Kyiv to identify the discrepancy between an 
emerging grassroots process of social and cultural pluralism, and the government’s 
monolithic representation of identity, militancy, and nationalist ideology.  
Chapter Outline 
The Introduction provides a general overview of the work and outlines its structure. 
Chapter I provides a historical context to address the postcolonial, value-oriented 
character of the Maidan protest and to frame the further argument regarding the tension 
between decommunization strategy and the emerging grassroots approach to public space. 
Chapter II analyzes the spatial organization of Independence square (Maidan) and 
other parts of Kyiv’s Administrative Center (Bessarabska and European Squares). The 
symbolism of three Lenin statues on each square together with Stalinist architecture provides 
an image of a Soviet power hierarchy in sharp contrast with the neoliberal character of the 
adjacent recently built shopping malls. The Maidan protest took place against the 
metaphorical backdrop of this setting—between the totalitarian past and the capitalist future. 
Chapter III deconstructs the symbolism of three Lenin statues and the Soviet method 
7 
of educating the masses by analyzing the audience responses from different generations of 
people who were exposed to Soviet history as contemporaries or as researchers, or who had 
worked with the locations or monuments in question. Furthermore, the chapter addresses 
artistic interventions at the site of a former Lenin monument in Kyiv to show the discrepancy 
between the official strategy regarding public space and the popular drive to diversify it. 
Analysis of a specific work, ​Inhabiting Shadows ​(Fig. 4), as a part of a pioneering project, 
“Social Contract,” through the aspects of patronage, temporality, and site-specificity explores 
the paradigm shift in popular perception of public art following the revolution. In this context 
I advocate the importance of temporary art projects in the process of democratizing the 
emerging state. 
The Conclusion recaps the main argument of a drastic discrepancy between the 
official—both Soviet and Ukrainian—didactic approach to public space and the grassroots 
vision of it. Despite the “intellectual reductionism” of the media and authorities, which 
oversimplifies the current political, social, and cultural situations and narrows them to a 
primarily national agenda, the examples of recent public art and the transformation of public 
space in Kyiv signal that it is becoming a place for democratic communication and 
community engagement. The field study of individual perceptions of Soviet visual symbols 
of power, as well as the analysis of post-Maidan creative expressions, suggest that an 
anti-authoritarian approach to public space is emerging, and that the demand for “popular” art 
(i.e. that which is open to public participation and contributions) constitutes an alternative to 
the totalitarian model of public space as a vehicle of state propaganda. 
Since a significant part of the study analyzes ongoing sociopolitical and cultural 
phenomena, the Epilogue will provide a brief up-to-date description of the current situation 
regarding the subject. 
8 
Chapter I: Manipulating the Historical Narrative 
In late 2013, downtown Kyiv erupted in a peaceful protest that would turn into the 
most massive social upheaval in the history of Ukraine’s independence. This protest, initially 
called the “Euromaidan” (combining the protesters’ drive for integration with the European 
Union and “maidan,” the Ukrainian name for Independence Square where it took place), later 
came to be known as the Maidan or the Revolution of Dignity.​ ​After a series of violent events 
involving protesters, riot police, and unknown shooters, the protest culminated in the ousting 
of Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych. This was immediately followed by a series of 
changes in Ukraine's sociopolitical system, including the formation of a new interim 
government, the restoration of the previous constitution, and a call to hold impromptu 
presidential elections within months. These historical events were often claimed to be a birth 
of a modern civic society in Ukraine, marking the end of a long post-communist transition 
period.  In 1991, Ukraine had “gained independence by chance”  due to the dissolution of the 8 9
USSR, and after more than twenty years of transition and few significant protests, the 
2013-2014 Maidan became a moment of clear articulation of Ukrainian political subjectivity. 
However, Russia’s military intervention and involvement with Ukrainian politics, the 
complexity of representing the protest in the media, and the lack of scholarship and rigorous 
work on developing Maidan values in post-Maidan Ukraine laid the ground for casting the 
protest as a nationalist revolution. In the aftermath of the Maidan (and in light of the ongoing 
military conflict in the Eastern part of Ukraine) such a broad manipulation of national 
sentiment became a convenient strategy for the Ukrainian government to propel the 
anti-colonial narrative and replace the anti-establishment nature of the Maidan with the false 
8 Ilya Gerasimov, “Ukraine 2014: The First Postcolonial Revolution. Introduction to the  
Forum,” ​Ab Imperio 15​, no. 3, (2014): 27. 
 
9 Serhy Yekelchyk, ​Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation​ (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 224. 
9 
idea of a nationalist one. By highlighting a few major moments in the Maidan’s timeline and 
placing them in historical context, this chapter emphasizes the massive grassroots 
involvement in the formation of a public sphere based on democratic values and its 
subsequent misrepresentation as a nationalistic revolution, resulting in the official politics of 
fixed identities that manifests itself in far-reaching decommunization laws. 
It all started on November 21, 2013, with a brief Facebook post written by Mustafa 
Nayem, a well-known Ukrainian journalist, after news broke that the Ukrainian government 
was hesitating over signing the long-promised Association Agreement with the European 
Union at the upcoming summit in Vilnius, choosing instead to seek closer economic relations 
with Russia. Nayem invited his Facebook followers to meet him near the monument to 
Independence in the Maidan Square at 10:30 p.m., and further incited their action by writing, 
“Don’t just ‘like’ this post. Write that you are ready, and we can try to start something.”  10
That night what is now referred to as “the Maidan” began with about 2,000 protesters — 
predominantly journalists, writers, artists, activists, and students — gathered to express their 
dissatisfaction with president Viktor Yanukovich’s decision. As the protest went on, the 
number of demonstrators demanding the resignation of the government grew, increasing 
sharply upon the announcement that Yanukovich had indeed rejected signing the agreement. 
The situation escalated on November 30 as the Berkut special police unit violently 
beat protesters at 4 a.m., when the number of people in the square was minimal and there 
were no bypassers to see the assault. The statements made by government representatives and 
some well-known Ukrainians the next day suggested that there was a public need to clear the 
square, claiming that “because of the Euromaidan rally children will be deprived of a 
10 Joshua Yaffa, “After the Revolutions,” ​The New Yorker​ (September 5, 2016): 40. 
 
10 
traditional symbol of the festive season.”  With the entire square cordoned off, protesters 11
moved to the neighbouring Mykhailivska Square. A few days later the protesters had 
reoccupied Maidan Square, the empty carcass of the uninstalled Christmas tree becoming a 
key visual symbol (Fig.5). Besides being the subject of memes and jokes online, the tree also 
served as a place to collect and display various protest posters and flags from all over the 
country. At this moment Maidan gained nationwide exposure, mobilizing people who had not 
necessarily supported integration with the EU, but were outraged by the violence of the 
police; it became an anti-establishment protest, addressing widespread government 
corruption, abuse of power, and human rights violations in Ukraine. 
The protest agenda had been widely communicated in Kyiv’s public space through 
street art and graffiti, posters and stickers, and various DIY banners. Messages such as 
“human rights above all,” “I am a drop in the ocean,” and appropriated slogans from France’s 
May 1968 social revolution appeared on various available surfaces with the intention of 
engaging more people and voicing grievances regarding the Yanukovich regime, especially 
the brutal police attacks on protesters that occurred again on December 1 (Figs.6-8). These 
complaints soon acquired an international dimension due to Russia’s immediate reaction to 
the revolutionary events: false news reports on Russian TV portraying Kyiv’s protest as 
ultra-nationalist and fascist in nature, as well as an unscheduled meeting between President 
Yanukovych and Russian President Vladimir Putin that took place in the southern Russian 
city of Sochi on December 6, followed by an announcement of Yanukovych’s subsequent 
visit to Moscow on December 17, where a “major agreement” would be signed.  12
11 ​Interfax-Ukraine​, “Euromaidan returns Christmas tree to children,” accessed May 24, 2017, 
http://en.interfax.com.ua/news/press-release/182502.html. 
 
12 ​BBC News​, “Russia and Ukraine Leaders Seek Partnership Treaty,” December 6, 2013, accessed 
December 19, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-25267130; ​Reuters​, "Russia-Ukraine 
Talks Fuel Suspicion, Anger in Kiev," December 7, 2013, accessed December 19, 2016, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/us-russia-ukraine-idUSBRE9B606020131207; Live updates of the 
11 
Fueled by this disclosure, popular dissatisfaction was projected onto the Lenin 
monument in Kyiv, which was rapidly toppled on December 8, 2013 (Fig.1). This physical 
attack on the Soviet monument could be understood as a symbolic attack on the embodiment 
of the totalitarian past widely associated with Putin’s regime, which has been marked by the 
decline of democratic principles and a return to methods of political repression characteristic 
of Soviet times, promotions of conservative values and religious fundamentalism, and the 
persecution and murder of opposition leaders and journalists. Yet, the episode with the Lenin 
monument reveals the complexity of the situation, because even at that moment, this 
anti-colonial narrative did not represent the majority of protesters’ views. Even though the 
use of the national anthem and the blue-yellow colors of the national Ukrainian flag (often 
interwoven with the EU ribbon) could be easily read as symbols of nationalist protest, they 
had been used since the early days of the Maidan as signifiers of pro-democratic unity. When 
the right-wing activists destroyed the monument in an act for which the political party 
Svoboda​ claimed responsibility, the crowd of the Maidan protesters was not homogenous and 
had a full spectrum of political views from left to right. Even many of those who cheered the 
demolition did not necessarily endorse the nationalist agenda (remarkably, ​Svoboda​ gained 
only 4% of votes in the post-Maidan elections). Moreover, the intense reaction signaled the 
absence of a uniform opinion regarding Soviet monuments. Apparently, it was not the 
fostering of the communist regime that prompted many intellectuals to criticize the attack on 
a monument, but the problem of radical destruction of symbols of the past and its subsequent 
criminalization. However, the events at the Lenin monument provided useful images for a 
mass media that would frequently use a nationalist portrayal of the protest to make their 
reports easily comprehensible to audiences, thus planting the seeds of later distortion 
protests, ​Kyiv Post,​ November 27–29, 2013. 
12 
regarding the nature of post-Maidan Ukraine. 
The protest reached its climax on February 20, 2014, when more than a hundred 
protesters were killed in 48 hours, with uniformed snipers shooting at them from rooftops. On 
February 22, president Yanukovych fled the country to Russia after protest leaders and 
politicians agreed to form a new temporary government. Within a few days, Russian soldiers 
in unmarked uniforms took control of strategic positions and infrastructure within the 
Ukrainian territory of Crimea. Russia then annexed the peninsula after a disputed referendum 
condemned by the U.S. and Europe as illegal. During the following months, pro-Russian 
militants seized government buildings in the eastern cities of Donetsk, Luhansk, and Kharkiv, 
calling for a referendum on independence and claiming independent republics of “DNR” 
(Donetsk People’s Republic) and “LNR” (Luhansk People’s Republic). Since 2014, the 
conflict has killed more than 10,000 Ukrainians, wounded over 20,000 and displaced about 
1.7 million people, according to estimates by the U.N. and other humanitarian aid groups. At 
the time of this writing, this conflict is Europe’s only ongoing land war.  13
Despite Russia’s actual invasion of Ukraine, the depiction of the Maidan protests as a 
national or anti-colonial revolution is essentially reductionist and, thus, alarming in its 
misrepresentation of the grassroots formation of a democratic public sphere during the 
protest. The available contemporary and historical sources show that the nationalist agenda 
was neither primary nor dominant during the Maidan. In one of them, Ilya Gerasimov 
employs postcolonial theory to refute the anti-colonial paradigm and to argue that the 
Maidan— focused on constructing a new society rather than litigating the past colonial 
13 The majority of members of the international community, as well as organizations such as Amnesty 
International, have condemned Russia for its actions in post-revolutionary Ukraine, accusing it of 
violating international law and Ukrainian sovereignty; many countries implemented economic 
sanctions against Russia, as well as some of its citizens and companies. 
 
13 
experience— was a unique event in the post-Soviet context. He emphasizes the importance of 
new common values that constitute the “new, hybrid and inсlusive Ukrainian-ness.” It was 
not the past (with its reliance on nationalism or religious fundamentalism) that defined the 
Maidan, rather, the idea of the nation was the outcome of the protest. According to 
Gerasimov: 
There was no real preexisting historical Ukrainian state to be restored within its 
original borders, and no homogenous nation in agreement about its composition. No 
collective or national will led to Euromaidan. On the contrary, it was Euromaidan as 
an event, a social structure, and a political process that stimulated the expression of 
individual subjectivities of people and greatly intensified and accommodated their 
exchange of opinions and ideas — whereas the main contribution of the preceding 
decade of Ukrainian history had been the elaboration of a set of common values that 
provided the necessary cumulative effect of  community-building to the mass scale 
exchange of ideas.…The Ukrainian nation became a product of the revolution, not its 
perpetrator.”  14
 
In fact, the national rhetoric during the Maidan was rather marginal, and at the subsequent 
election, the aforementioned nationalist party gained an insignificant amount of votes. 
Furthermore, the number of Ukrainian citizens sympathetic to association with Russia (40.5 
percent before the Maidan) had already decreased by half immediately following the protest. 
Gerasimov demonstrates that such a change in public opinion was a result of the Maidan, not 
its cause.  The historian concludes that with the metaphor of the “European choice” 15
suggesting a set of democratic values, the Maidan became a “creative act of 
self-determination,” and its popular title — The Revolution of Dignity — indicated a 
“fundamental quality of one’s developed subjectivity (cf. Latin ​dignita​s — worthiness).”  16
14 Gerasimov, “The First Postcolonial Revolution…,” 27 
 
15 Gerasimov “Ukraine’s Postcolonial Revolution and Counterrevolution,” 9-11. 
 
16 Gerasimov, “The First Postcolonial Revolution…,” 28. Gerasimov underlines the Maidan’s reliance 
on the European tradition of political liberalism that acknowledged the right of popular rebellion 
against tyranny; and notes that the protest was very Lockean in spirit in its declaration of civic 
14 
With a diversity that manifested itself through a variety of ethnicities, languages, 
cultures, religions, and political views, the Maidan became a ​multitude​ that unified a plethora 
of individuals under the same cause, yet with various agendas that resist any kind of a 
uniformed image.  Even in artistic terms, the ‘collective body’ of Maidan, with its massive 17
barricades made out of debris and collectively decorated for the holidays, its Tatlin-like metal 
carcass for the Christmas tree, and its ongoing carnivalesque atmosphere, when viewed in its 
entirety, becomes a Gesamtkunstwerk that eludes in-depth analysis because there is no 
appropriate category for it within existing systems of art. Nonetheless the images of the 
Maidan seemed like a “monolithic representation of identity, militancy, or the upholding of 
nationalist ideology, political activism of that period seemed to be value oriented, focusing on 
principles such as dignity, freedom, solidarity, cooperation, social  responsibility and 
celebration of multiculturalism in a diverse land.”  ​The public space of Kyiv’s center, shaped 18
and defined by ongoing social practices, played a crucial role as a place for conversation and 
community engagement.  
Despite the Maidan’s initial goals of pro-democratic change, a year after it ended and 
the new president Petro Poroshenko was elected, the official rhetoric and actions of the new 
Ukrainian government indicated that its representatives have chosen to see it as a nationalist 
and anti-colonial revolution.​ ​On April 9th, 2015, the Ukrainian Parliament passed a package 
subjectivity toward and disobedience of a government that disregarded people’s rights and interests. 
 
17 I use Spinoza’s term ​multitude​ in its later reiteration by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as a new 
model of resistance against global systems of power. The ​multitude​ is not “the people,” but rather 
many peoples acting in networked concert. Because of its plurality, its “innumerable internal 
differences”, the ​multitude​ contains the genus of true democracy. 
 
18 Grace Mahoney, “God and a Can of Spray Paint Are With Us: Post-Revolutionary Activist  





of four controversial decommunization laws, one of which— “On the condemnation of the 
communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their 
symbols”—affects public space immediately. The law essentially equates the Nazi and Soviet 
regimes, banning​ ​“any image, anthem, symbol, monuments, memorials, slogans, quotes, and 
names associated with either regime, plus the visual legacy of other European countries 
exposed to communism” (Appendix B).  According to the law, noncompliance with this ban 19
is a criminal act. Yet its obscurity—in fact, the law negates the entire seventy years of Soviet 
history present in practically every aspect of private and public life—makes its scope 
virtually unlimited,  censoring all domains of social life, including arts and education.  
The explanatory note to this law stressed that it required neither public discussion nor 
consent of the authorized representatives of national trade and labor unions, public 
organizations, and so on. Ironically, such an approach repeats the Soviet model of 
decisionmaking in which a few people define the correct idea of use of the public sphere, 
make their decision behind closed doors, and announce that any disagreement may be 
categorized as a criminal act. The radical sweep of the law and the uncompromising attitude 
of the government form a drastic contrast with the inclusive openness of the Maidan, as 
demonstrated by regular gatherings on the square to discuss pertinent issues in ‘​viche​’ public 
assemblies that transcended fixed identities.  20
Remarkably, among the initiators of the decommunization law were Oleg Lyashko, a 
19 “On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of 




20 ‘​Viche​’ (​‘veche’​) is an old slavic word for town’s meeting or popular assembly. In Medieval times in 
Kyiv Rus, ​vіche​ was the prototype of the self-rule. During the Maidan, ​viche ​became a protest 
tradition: every Sunday thousands of people gathered at the Maidan square to hear reports from 
opposition leaders, opinion makers, etc., and discuss the current situation.  
 
16 
Radical Party leader known for his populism and highly combative behavior, and Volodymyr 
Vyatrovych, known for his nationalist views and collaborating with the Security Service of 
Ukraine (the successor to the KGB).  The latter took the lead of the Ukrainian Institute of 21
National Memory soon after the Maidan, and became one of the most persistent advocates for 
decommunization, as well as the propagator of anti-colonial rhetoric, insisting that Ukraine’s 
“Sovietness” was the main cause of its economic crisis: 
The unvanquished totalitarian past still keeps Ukraine from developing as a European 
democratic state, for it is precisely on this island of “Sovietness”, which for historical 
reasons has remained strongest in Donbass and Crimea, that Putin's aggression against 
Ukraine rests. Holders of Soviet values (and not Russians or Russian speakers, as 
Russian state propaganda claims) today are a major recruit reserve for terrorist groups 
in the so-called DNR and LNR. So the question of “decommunization” in Ukraine 
today is not only a matter of humanitarian policy, but also security policy.  22
 
In short, instead of addressing contemporary Ukraine’s actual problems of corruption and 
abuse of power, the official conversation about Ukraine’s socioeconomic, political, and 
cultural stagnation emphasizes the national idea that emerged as an opposition to Soviet 
identity in reaction to Russia’s military intervention in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. 
Some historians have pursued a broader problematization of decommunization. 
Mykhailo Gaukhman, for instance, opposed the first wave of decommunization in 1991 that 
targeted the Communist party and its ideology, and its recent iteration aims to erase the very 
mythology of the USSR embedded in the daily routine of toponymic forms, etc.  Gaukhman 23
21 ​Istorychna Pravda​, “V Instytuti natsional'noï pam"iati – nove kerivnytstvo,” March 26, 2014, 
accessed December 19, 2016, ​http://www.istpravda.com.ua/short/2014/03/26/142108/​. 
 
22 Volodymyr Vyatrovych, “Decommunization and Academic Discussion,” ​Krytyka​, May 2016, 
accessed December 19, 2016, 
https://krytyka.com/ua/solutions/opinions/dekomunizatsiya-i-akademichna-dyskusiya. 
 
23 The first decommunization attempts in Ukraine took place as early as the time when Ukraine gained 
independence on August 25, 1991. The Monument to the Great October Revolution that was located 
on October Revolution Square (now Independence Square) and other major monuments to Lenin 
across the country were demolished according to a decision by the local city administration.  
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suggests that decommunization is based on conventional division of the political and public 
spheres — ideology and society in this case are separate entities, and in this perspective, 
society is a passive object of the totalitarian party.  Without the consideration of 24
“​opovsykdenyuvannya​” (quotidienation) of the regime and ideology in the everyday lives of 
people, decommunization simply repeats Soviet totalitarianism and criminalizes everyday 
social practices. Moreover, Gaukhman accurately points out that the law does not presuppose 
any mechanism to survey local communities regarding their opinion and wishes concerning 
what part of their communist heritage they want to keep or remove, or what would be the best 
substitution (if any) for them. Gaukhman implies that if the government grants itself sole 
legitimacy for decision-making regarding symbols, rhetoric, or history, it is engaging in the 
same practice against which new laws are ostensibly designed.  
Andrii Portnov also argues that the law is full of contradictions and reveals an 
ignorance  of the Soviet heritage. The historian emphasizes that Ukrainian public sphere 
tends to reductionism in the strict dichotomy “pro-Russian communism-” vs. “pro-Ukrainian 
decommunization,” lacking a critique of both nationalism and the communist narrative from 
democratic, pluralistic positions. For example, the Communist party erected a monument to 
Ivan Franko, the now-praised figure in Ukrainian poetry, yet it also censored his work and 
adapted it to the requirements of “building communism.”  Moreover, according to Portnov, 25
these laws shift the entire post-Maidan discussion to the issues of identity and memory as the 
key causes of the protest, whereas in fact, it was a social phenomenon that negated 
constructed dichotomies. Portnov emphasizes that the cultural diversity of Ukraine was a 
24 Mykhajlo Gaukhman, “The Decommunization Case,” ​Krytyka​, May 2015, accessed December 19, 
2016,​ ​https://krytyka.com/ua/solutions/opinions/sprava-pro-dekomunizatsiyu​. 
 
25 Andrii Portnov, “Pro dekomunizatsiyu identychnistʹ ta istorychni zakony deshcho inakshe,” ​Krytyka​, 




major factor that prevented the public sphere from being totalized under a single political 
agenda: 
In post-Soviet Ukraine, the lack of a uniform national public consensus on these 
memory and language issues has often been not so much a force for division but 
rather a stabilizing factor in a state characterized by so much diversity. It is precisely 
this lack of a nation-wide consensus that has helped preserve the distinctive pluralism 
of post-Soviet Ukraine’s public space and has maintained ambiguity as a way of 
avoiding social conflict, an obstacle to the monopolization of public space in the 
service of one political force or another.  26
 
Thus, by focusing on modernization and values, the Maidan expanded and articulated the 
pluralization of the public sphere. It transcended fixed identities to reach common consensus 
regarding the “European choice” as a model for future development, thus drastically 
differentiating the Ukrainian case from those of its neighbours, particularly Russia with its 
resurrection of imperial narratives and religious fundamentalism.   27
Thus, the drastic attempts to erase the very presence of the Soviet past in the built 
environment is both misleading and autocratic in its attempts to monopolize public space. 
According to the Institute of National Memory’s statistics, as of December 2016, 51,493 
toponymic places in Ukraine have been renamed, including 32 cities, 955 towns, and 25 
districts, as well as 51,493 streets, squares, parks, and more. 1320 monuments to Lenin and 
1069 other monuments of “totalitarian” era figures have been demolished.  Yet, after almost 28
two year of decommunization, Ukraine still holds a leading position in the ranking of most 
26 Andrii Portnov, “Post-Maidan Europe and the New Ukrainian Studies,” ​Slavic Review ​4, Vol.  
74, (Winter 2015): 726. 
 
27 Yaroslav Hrytsak, “Ignorance Is Power,” 227. 
 
28 ​Ukrinform​, “Decommunization reform: 25 districts and 987 populated areas in Ukraine renamed in 





corrupt countries.  In the everyday expressions of Ukrainians, the constructed dichotomy 29
between “sovietness” and “ukrainian-ness,” as well as the debates about identities and 
memory, overshadow debates about the actual causes of the Maidan.​ ​Apparently, rather than 
combatting corruption, decommunization in the hands of officials is a strategic tool for 
manipulating national sentiment. This strategy recreates the Soviet model of using public 
space as a means to disseminate fixed types of propaganda, despite the fact that Ukrainian 
history itself has a plethora of conflicting episodes requiring open and honest discussion 
instead of monumentalization.  
  
29 According to Transparency International, Ukraine’s Corruption Perceptions Index in 2016 was 29, 
which made the country one of top corrupted countries in the world.  
Transparency International​, “Corruption Perceptions Index 2016,” Accessed May 9, 2017, 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_perceptions_index_2016.  
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Chapter II: Maidan: Between the Totalitarian Past and the Capitalist Future 
The visual framing of the recent protest events together with the history of the place 
help to identify the formation of what is now designated by historians as the birth of the new 
“Ukrainian subjectivity.” Kyiv’s Independence Square provides a perfect visual setting for a 
historical overview of the city, its architecture offering a cultural snapshot of key historical 
events. Maidan Square is framed by epic Soviet buildings and is part of the city’s 
administrative center, designed and erected in the 1930s when the capital of the Ukrainian 
Soviet Socialist Republic moved from Kharkiv back to Kyiv. Stalin’s Empire-style edifices 
meant to signal the tremendous power of the totalitarian USSR; however, with time, the 
square evolved into an arena for exchange of public opinions and protests such as ‘Ukraine 
without Kuchma’ at the turn of the millennium. In response, the government decided to 
redesign the square, filling it with controversial glass constructions, and building a giant 
shopping mall beneath it. The Maidan protest took place against this metaphorical setting—a 
sort of a liminal state in between the totalitarian past and the capitalist future. The shiny 
commercial centers remained open and undamaged throughout the revolution and served as a 
contrasting backdrop to the striking image of tired and dirty protesters holding paving stones 
in their hands. On the one hand, this new ‘Ukrainian-ness’ was surrounded on all sides by 
vestiges of totalitarianism, but on the other hand, European integration as the chief reason for 
the Maidan protests (which meant first and foremost certain economic and travel freedoms, as 
opposed to Soviet government control over citizens’ lives, in particular, their financial 
situation and freedom of movement) signalled an inevitable assimilation to the capitalist 
development of the West. 
The spatial organization of Maidan deserves consideration, since the very existence of 
this specific geographical location, its occupation, and social practices of interaction within it 
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have been indispensable factors in the creation of a Ukrainian public forum. Moreover, the 
deconstruction of ideological agendas implemented in architecture and monumental art 
further illustrates the paradigmatic shift in popular perception of public space. By analyzing 
the Soviet model of using public space as a means of controlling the masses as opposed to the 
new capitalist model of entertaining the masses and promoting consumption, and by tracing 
changes within the spatial organization of the Maidan Square and administrative center, this 
chapter identifies the emergence of a new stratum, a grassroots movement that through the 
practice of occupying public space refused to fit either  the totalitarian or the capitalist 
paradigm, laying the groundwork for a new post-colonial “Ukrainian-ness” that culminated 
during the recent protests.  
The Soviet Model: Educating the Masses 
If art becomes public property it will organize the consciousness and psyche of the masses by 
organizing objects and ideas. 
 —Alexey Babichev  30
The history of the USSR contains various periods that left distinct impacts on the 
country’s political program, and as a direct consequence, on its architectural landscape and 
public spaces. The reconstruction of Kyiv’s center, which later became a scene for the protest 
actions in question, belongs to the Stalinist period, yet its heavy ideological weight has its 
origins in the earlier times of the Soviet avant-garde. Although within the field of Western art 
history it is common to contrast the period of the Soviet avant-garde of the 1920s with the 
period of Socialist Realism, which formed as a style later in the 1930s, both of these defining 
Soviet art movements drew upon the idea of educating the masses through art, implemented 
30 A.V. Babichev, cited in Hubertus Gassner, “Analytical Sequences,” in ​Alexander Rodchenko​, ed. 
David Elliott (Oxford: Museum of Modern Art, 1979): 110. 
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in public space through the use of monumental sculpture and architecture.  Understanding 31
the formation of this idea helps to assess the historical reconstructions of the Maidan Square 
and their ideological implications in a more meaningful context. 
Especially relevant to this study is Boris Groys’ thesis arguing that while there were a 
number of formal differences between the Soviet Avant-garde and Socialist Realism, both 
movements in essence shared a key defining idea of using art to create and shape a society 
which was not only receptive to the message of that art, but also capable of engaging with it 
and thus becoming participants in the great socialist project. In the 1920s, avant-garde artists 
(including many groups and individuals such as LEF, the Constructivists, Kazimir Malevich, 
and others) reacted to the rapid industrialization of the Soviet Union and its dramatically new 
political direction. They used different methods to achieve the same goal—supporting the 
Soviet idea of creating a new society with a new type of citizen and transforming aesthetics to 
serve progressive political thinking. As Boris Groys described it, “avant-garde artists wished 
to create a new public, a new type of human being, who would share their own taste and see 
the world through their eyes. They sought to change humankind, not art. The ultimate artistic 
act would be not the production of new images for an old public to view with old eyes, but 
the creation of a new public with new eyes.”   This conception of the purpose of art was 32
radical in merging  the political with the artistic, forming a specific type of discourse in 
which every decision regarding a work of art was made only after weighing its political 
31 ​Benjamin H. D. Buchloh, “From Faktura to Factography,” ​October ​30, (Autumn, 1984): 82 – 119. 
Western art history widely accepts the idea of a rift between the Soviet avant-garde of the 1920s and 
the Socialist Realism of the 1930s—the latter being formed at a time when the Soviet government 
apparatus consolidated more and more power, and began to use art as a means of spreading the 
party line while simultaneously repressing artists who dared to offer opinions or ideas which 
contrasted with it. Many important figures from the Avant-garde movement were forced to publicly 
denounce their previous work and ideas, or risk being exiled or worse. 
 
32 Boris Groys, “Educating the Masses: Socialist Realist Art,” in ​Art Power​ (The MIT Press Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: 2008), 147. 
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considerations.  
The same idea, as shown by Groys, was present in the Soviet project, one of the biggest 
aims of which was the disrupting the individual’s link with nature (including ideas of human 
nature) in order to create a totally new social construct. Following in the avant-garde’s 
footsteps, Stalinist art had as its goal the creation of a new society which would be receptive 
to it — in essence, its own audience. In his book ​Gesamtkunstwerk Stalin​ (​Total Art of 
Stalinism​), Groys addressed the “Soviet space” itself both as a work of art and simultaneously 
as its own author; he metaphorically claimed that the Communist Party was an artist who 
sought to “overcome the resistance of the material”: 
Soviet culture under Stalin inherited the avant-garde belief that humanity could be 
changed and thus was driven by the conviction that human beings are malleable. 
Soviet culture was a culture for masses that had yet to be created.    33
 
Thus, the totality of the utopian Soviet project lay in this idea of the collective body meant to 
be created and shaped by means of art and information. For that matter, all proletarian 
interaction with art and science was to take place under the slogan “art as a way of 
life-building.”   On April 23​rd​, 1932 the Central Committee issued a decree banning all kinds 34
of artistic activity outside of the newly established  “artists’ unions,” the goal of which was to 
control the working process of artists as well as to monitor their communication with each 
other. Already in 1934, Socialist Realism was declared as the mandatory method for all artists 
and every work of art had to meet certain criteria and fit into the social program to be 
“correct” in its form and content.  
     One might still ask, what is it about the idea of educating the masses through art that 
appears as unusual, if in fact the shaping of society through cultivation of taste is a method 
33 Boris Groys, ​Gesamtkunstwerk Сталин​ (Ад Марингем Пресс: 2013), 6. 
 
34 Vl. S. Soloviov, cited in Boris Groys, ​Gesamtkunstwerk Сталин, ​61. 
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that has existed in different cultures throughout time. The answer to this question would 
reveal the inner core of the Soviet project and the propaganda that was the main component 
of all types of Soviet art. Even though Socialist Realism was claimed to be realistic, the 
reality it intended to portray often constituted a broad discrepancy with people’s actual 
experiences. In essence, the Soviet concept of “truth” that the rule-abiding Socialist-Realist 
artists had to relay in their work was similar to today’s concept of “post-truth”. The ability to 
make the correctly ‘Socialist’ selection of current and historical facts was regarded as the 
most important quality of a Socialist artist. As Boris Ioganson puts it: “A fact is not the whole 
truth; it is merely the raw material from which the real truth of art must be smelted and 
extracted...”  In practice, this meant that art had to be accessible to the masses on the level of 35
form, although its content and goals were ideologically determined and aimed at 
manipulating “the masses.” The totality of a party line and and the strict control over its 
practical implementation left no place for any kind of otherness, be it in the way of thinking 
or looking. Thus, all aspects of public and private life were under a total uniformity, which 
imitated the idea of building a happy socialist future, yet advanced the power hierarchy and 
maintained a drastic contrast between authorities and the people. 
Kyiv’s Center in the Turbulent Times of Soviet Ideological Shifts 
The analysis of strategic (i.e. ideological) decisions that defined spatial organization, 
architecture, and monumental art of Kyiv’s central city space delves into how the creation of 
this utopian Soviet society was meant to be carried out within the framework of the city’s 
main square and questions the effectiveness of such a program. As the Stalinist era dawned 
over the USSR, plans for the reconstruction of many major Soviet cities were already being 
implemented—and these plans already included provisions for the special nature and purpose 
35 Boris Ioganson, cited in Boris Groys, ​Art Power​, 145. 
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of public spaces. Remarkably, the idea of manipulating the masses by means of public space 
had already been partially developed in Kyiv during the Soviet avant-garde period, when two 
of its key figures—Kazimir Malevich and Vladimir Tatlin—lived and taught there. As early 
as 1919, Tatlin (only a year prior to the development of the legendary ​Monument to the III 
International​) was already propagandizing the idea of an all-encompassing “monument of a 
new type.” The artist had foreshadowed the new Soviet architecture, which was to be “new” 
in all senses of the word, from its physical forms to its social significance.  In the words of a 36
contemporary of Tatlin, N.Punin: 
The monument of a new type” was to include lecture halls and an 
agitation/propaganda center, from which “calls to action, proclamations, brochures 
would be distributed all over the city…on one of the expansive wings of the 
monument…an enormous screen must be placed which would broadcast by way of a 
cinematographic tape, in the evenings, the most up-to-date events in the world of 
international culture and politics. The monument will also contain a radio receptor 
which will broadcast frequencies from all over the world…and other various media of 
information. It must also possess…a projection station, which would project letters 
onto the clouds…; letters which could be used to compose various slogans consistent 
with the events of the day….it is necessary that all possible technologies which can be 
used for the dissemination of agitation materials and propaganda be incorporated as 
elements of the monument…   37
 
This idea of creating enormous architectural objects, which would simultaneously be 
functional constructions and means of disseminating propaganda, leads naturally to the idea 
of a city as organism in constant flux and development that, of course, must only proceed in 
accordance with party ideals. Such monumental objects, through a synthesis of the aesthetic 
and creative with the functional and technical, were meant to directly affect the masses, to 
mold and shape them.  
36 Boris Yerofalov-Pilipchak, ​Архитектура советского Киева​ (​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​) (Kyiv: 
A+C, 2010), 23-26. 
 
37 Ibid., 140. 
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As mentioned earlier, this radical attempt to write the political narrative through the use 
of everyday life and public space was overtaken by Stalinism and, as a result, took on 
different dimensions altogether starting in the 1930s. The exemplary model for creation of 
symbols of power in the public space of Soviet cities was the competition for the design of 
the future Palace of Soviets—a government centre in the middle of Moscow, which was 
meant to become the tallest building in the world at the time. The winning project, designed 
by Boris Iofan, became a canonical example of Utopian Totalitarian architecture: a building 
1378 feet in height, to be crowned with a grandiose monument to Vladimir Lenin.  The outer 38
appearance of the building was to resemble a pyramid, the apex of which would be the figure 
of “​vozhd​” (the leader) as Lenin was known in Soviet times (Fig. 9). As such, the project is a 
lasting visual illustration to the Soviet concept of the “power vertical.” According to plans, 
the building was meant to be clearly visible from a distance of up to 22 miles. That is to say, 
even from a great distance, the people were to be able to gaze up from the ground at the 
figure of their supreme leader— a symbolic manifestation of Soviet power dynamics between 
the people and the government.  39
Moscow’s contest became a prototype for other Soviet cities. Thus, a similar process 
took place in Kyiv, which again became the capital of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic and seat 
of the government in 1934. Previously, in 1919-1934, Kharkiv had been the capital because 
Kyiv was considered anti-Soviet and Moscow officials would not risk to have a government 
there until all Ukrainian independence movements had been brutally repressed. At this time 
Kyiv was in a state of overall decline due to the ravages of collectivization as well the 
38 D.V. Sarabyanov, ed., ​История русского и советского искусства​ (​History of Russian and 
Soviet Art​) (Высшая школа, 1979), 321. 
 
39 In order to construct the Palace of Soviets, the Church of Christ the Savior was demolished and the 
foundation for the Palace laid in its place. The project was abruptly brought to a halt by World War II. 
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Holodomor famine, orchestrated by Stalin to take place in Ukraine from 1932 to 1933.  40
Within the framework of rebuilding the city, the government announced a contest for the 
design of a government center and received many grandiose submissions, much like the 
Moscow contest (Figs. 10-14). One of the main points on the reconstruction agenda was the 
creation of “a central government square in the Soviet capital—a goal not just of a technical 
but a deeply political nature, since the square’s future architectural complex was to become a 
living example of those enormous creative achievements which characterize our unstoppable 
growth in all areas of Socialist construction.”  The winning project by I. Langbard was 41
meant to be located in the square neighboring today’s Maidan and would require the 
demolition of the Mikhaylovsky Zlatoverkhy Monastery (Fig. 15). The project’s construction 
was also halted by World War II, and the monastery was rebuilt in the 1990s, when the 
challenge of reconstructing Ukrainian identity emerged in a newly independent country.  42
Even though the Central Committee building was initially meant to be part of a complex 
together with a Council of People’s Commissars building and a monument to Lenin between 
the two, the only completed part of the grand totalitarian project was the construction of the 
Central Committee of the Communist Party Headquarters (which currently serves as the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs) in 1938. The rest of the project  was halted first by the 
dissatisfaction with Langbard and then by the Second World War.   43
40 The Holodomor (Ukrainian: Голодомо́р) was a man-made famine in Soviet Ukraine in 1932-1933 
that in a peacetime catastrophe killed an officially estimated 7 million to 10 million people, the majority 
of whom were ethnic Ukrainians. Since 2006, the Holodomor has been recognized by Ukraine and 15 
other countries as a genocide of the Ukrainian people carried out by the Soviet government. 
 
41 P. Yurchenko, cited in Yerofalov-Pilipchak, ​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​, 167. 
 
42 During the events of the Maidan protests the monastery served as a safe haven for protesters after 
they became the subjects of attacks by police and government forces. It also became an improvised 
soup kitchen, first aid station and field hospital; the bodies of murdered protesters were also brought 
here. 
 
43 Yerofalov-Pilipchak, ​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​, 228. 
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From 1935 on, the Maidan was known as Kalinin Square and after World War II it 
became an important part of the ambitious post-war Khreshchatyk reconstruction plans, 
which lasted from the late 1940s to the late 1950s.  Most entries to the contest, announced in 44
1944, used the classical format of combining multiple purposes in one architectural complex. 
As a result, the winner was a synthesis of projects which suggested a filling of the square 
with monumental constructions, their style based upon classical Western European 
architecture and utilizing Ukrainian folk elements (16).  Khreshchatyk’s new appearance 45
was an integral architectural ensemble 4000 feet long and averaging 245 feet wide, with three 
squares (Besarabska, Kalinin, and Stalin (Fig. 17)), broad sidewalks, and buildings from 
various periods. It was during this time also that Khreschatyk was declared the main street of 
the city, and Kalinina Square the main square. A giant Hotel Moskva was erected in 1961 at 
the Southern side of the square, reminiscent of Moscow State University (Fig. 18). This was 
an essentially ideological decision intended to demonstrate that Kyiv’s main square derived 
its role of the ideological center from Moscow as the center of the empire.  As one of the 46
highest buildings in Kyiv at a time, it was both distanced from city life, yet visible from afar, 
implementing the vertical of power. Khreschatyk Street thus assumed the function of the 
procedural axis of Kyiv. Soviet architects were also tasked with functioning as “social 
architects” of the regime and, as such, creating ceremonial monuments and parade squares, 
44 Up to the 1830s, a large part of the current Maidan space was known as “Goats’ Swamp” since 
many local families took their goats out to graze there. It was also an important location because it 
connected three main parts of the city: Verkhny Gorod (the seat of political power), Nizhny Gorod 
(commercial center) and Pechersky Hills (spiritual center). In the 1850s, the city expanded and what is 
now the Maidan became one of the main city squares with a main bourgeois boulevard (analogous to 
many European cities of the time) running through it. That thoroughfare would become today’s 
Khreschatyk Street. In 1876, the city parliament or Duma was built on the square, and the square was 
renamed Dumskaya.   
 
45 Yerofalov-Pilipchak, ​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​, 286-335. 
 
46 Olena Oliynyk, “The Architectural Image of Kiev’s Central Square as a Symbol of National Identity,” 
in Ana Maria Zahariade, ed. ​De Urbanitate. Tales of Urban Lives and Spaces​ (2015): 86. 
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public spaces that, under the slogan of “All belongs to the people” were actually meant to 
appropriate the public experiences of citizens through amassing large numbers of people 
within the public space and allowing the government to monitor and assess citizens en masse. 
In this context, totalitarian and authoritarian regimes use of the concept of “masses”  not so 
much in order to create a feeling of belonging and interconnectedness among citizens based 
on shared memories, traditions, and history as to establish a mechanism of “belonging” to the 
extraterritorial, incorporeal Soviet “collective body.”  Remarkably, in his notes for the 47
reconstruction of the square (1976-1981), the architect A. Komarovsky mentions that the 
square was intended for ceremonial uses such as taking the military oath, Young Pioneer 
induction ceremonies, and so on — indispensable parts of the ideological conditioning of 
Soviet youth.  48
 Kalinin Square was indeed made twice as large during the reconstruction, however, it 
was meant for “anything but mass protests” and the space itself was meant to fulfill a 
“policing function” (Figs. 19-20).  It is visible (and, as follows, can be shot at) from every 49
angle and accessible from multiple streets, each of which in turn has access to a large number 
of administrative buildings. The grandeur of this endeavor immediately calls to mind 
Haussmann’s project for the reconstruction of Paris and presupposed the creation of free lines 
47 Ihor Tyshchenko and Svitlana Shlipchenko, “Maidan: vid prostoru protestu do ‘urbanistychnoho 
spilnoho’.” Yak tvorylasya urbanistychna evtopiya” (“Maidan: from the ptotest space to ‘urban 
commons.’ How the urban utopy had been created”) in ​(Ne)zadovolennya publichnimi prostoramy 
(​(Dis)satisfaction with public spaces​) (Kyiv: Vsesvit, 2017): 98. 
 
48 A.V. Komarovsky, “Glavnaya ploshad’ respubliki” (“Republik’s Main Square”), ​Architecture and 
Building​ 2-12 (Kyiv, 1978): 18-20. 
 
49 Yerofalov-Pilipchak, ​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​, 148-149. Pilipchak also emphasizes that the 
governmental buildings, located within walking distance from the square, are all interconnected by a 
secret network of underground tunnels corresponding to metro stations, government offices, and 
special shelters. Yet, he does not provide sources and probably repeats the popular urban legend 
regarding the underground tunnels. According to contemporary researchers of Kyiv’s Soviet 
architecture, such as Semen Shyrochyn and Oleksandr Burlaka, there is no proof or declassified 
information about such a network (private conversation, May 2017). 
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of fire and mechanisms for discouraging the making of barricades. The irony is that despite 
Marxism-Leninism being a founding philosophy of the USSR, Stalin, who “resembled a 
particularly despotic student of Haussmann” ignored Marx’s loathing for the planner who 
“replaced historic Paris with the Paris of the sightseer.”  In the actual square, one really does 50
have the feeling of being placed in a panopticon. Even during the Maidan events of 2014, 
when all entrances to the square were barricaded off, there was a distinct feeling of having 
nowhere to hide and nowhere to run. Eventually, this space did perform its policing function 
when after several months of revolution and physical confrontation between the protesters 
and government forces at the barricades, dozens of protesters were shot by snipers who were 
positioned on the roof of one of the government buildings and could thus survey the entire 
square. 
Besides the ideological implication of spatial organization and of architecture, 
monumental art, which would fulfill the didactic and legitimizing function sought by the 
Soviet government, was necessary to public spaces of such importance. Thus the entire 
post-war administrative center anticipated “leaders” to take over its most visible spots. The 
first Lenin monument was erected in 1946 on Bessarabska Square, the second one on Kalinin 
square in 1977 (when it was renamed, once more, to Great October Revolution Square), and 
the third inside the newly constructed Lenin Museum on Stalin square (which was in early 
1961 renamed Lenin Komsomol Square) in 1982 (Figs.1-3). Having considered the party’s 
particular concerns with public space, this raises the question: why had it taken almost four 
decades between the mid 1940’s and the early 80’s to make these decisions regarding the 
placement of monuments? Despite the the seemingly rapid course of monumentalization, 
50 Owen Hatherley, “Architects of revolt: the Kiev square that sparked Ukraine's insurrection,” ​The 




which began with the installation of a Lenin monument on the peripheral Bessarabska square 
and dedication of the pre-war III International Square to Stalin (likely a backlash to the 
German decision to name it Adolf Hitler square during the occupation in 1941-43), the main 
square had remained empty. 
Although the reactionary post-war plan envisioned the intensification  of the cult of 
Stalin through the grandeur of WWII victory, the further indecision regarding monuments 
becomes self-evident. Apparently there had been a loss of direction and clarity in the political 
and ideological agendas following the death of Stalin in 1953 and the subsequent process of 
dismantling his legacy that began in 1956 with Nikita Khrushchev’s speech “On the 
Personality Cult and its Consequences” at the 20th Party Congress of The Central Committee 
of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Studying the archives of the ​Architecture and 
Building​ magazine for the 1950s provides several clues. In the vague language used by 
architects and journalists of the time to avoid risking wrong interpretations and subsequent 
discipline or repression, there is a sense of circumventing ideological issues. For instance, 
authors would address the grand scale of pos-twar mass constructions of residential 
complexes (a project announced by the party at the beginning of the 1950s) as well as the 
party’s 1956 resolution “On Removing Excessive Elements in Architecture” (A&B 4 (18), 
1955); or poor financial management due to which construction is failing to fit into deadlines 
set by the party (A&B 4 (16), 1955). Probably, the ideological situation became even more 
unstable: articles from this time are often full of harsh criticism, including towards the newly 
constructed buildings in Kyiv’s center. Only one author,​ ​O. Kasiyanov, within the entire 
decade addressed the monumental sculpture by firstly mentioning the need to install a 
monument to Stalin on the Stalin Square to complement Bessarabska Square’s Lenin statue, 
yet suggesting that the geographic specificities of Kyiv (the city is built on hills) is an 
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obstacle to implementing the plan. Kasiyanov first rhetorically questions whether Stalin 
Square is actually a square and points out that since it is rather an intersection of roads, it 
would not be appropriate to house an ideologically important monument to Stalin—it is 
simply too small for such a massive and meaningful figure. Moreover, to expand the space 
and make it into a “real square” it would be necessary to level the hills, which is a “time 
consuming and improbable project.”  Thus, the idea was abandoned; eventually, in 1982, the 51
square became home to an expansive Lenin Museum and a large indoor monument to Lenin 
(Figs. 21, 3).  
What was specifically remarkable about this period as reflected in scholarly articles on 
architecture is that by the end the 1950’s, the Soviet people had learned to adjust to political 
narratives, and since this was never consistently clear (especially after the public 
denunciation of the previously sacred Stalin figure), to avoid decision-making that could be 
interpreted as a clear statement of ideology. This leads to a question: if in the period of rapid 
ideological shifts there was no truth for people to follow, what was the role of those later 
Lenin monuments? What ideological weight could they have at a time when ideology itself 
was becoming a simulacrum? Chapter III of this study, which focuses on audience responses 
and grassroots reactions to these monuments, will question their didactic ideological efficacy. 
Independent Maidan 
In the 1980s, as the programs of perestroika and glasnost took hold in the USSR, 
ideological controls were greatly relaxed and the October Revolution Squares became a 
regular meeting place for intellectuals who would eagerly come together to discuss current 
political events (something previously subject to punishment). A re-conceptualization of the 
space through appropriation in Lefebvre’s sense—that is, modification of the space by a 
51 O. Kasiyanov, “Problema reconstrukcii i zabudovy ploshch Kieva (Problem of reconstruction of 
Kyiv’s squares),” ​Architecture and Building​ 5 (1953): 8-12. 
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group of people to serve their own needs and possibilities—also took place; its new nature 
was shaped by the social practices produced and regulated by this space itself.  From this 52
moment in history, in the minds of citizens, the Maidan became an arena for publicly voicing 
one’s opinion. Since then it has also witnessed several important protests, some of which 
have led to changes in government, if not the overall structure. The first of these was the 
student Revolution on Granite in 1990, which anticipated the collapse of the USSR. Later, to 
break up another of those protests—2000’s Ukraine Against Kuchma—the government 
decided to redesign the square and announced that the purpose of this reconstruction was the 
upcoming tenth anniversary of Ukraine’s independence. As a result, it was filled with 
controversial glass structures and a giant shopping mall was constructed beneath it (Fig. 22). 
The period of Leonid Kuchma’s presidency (1994-2005) — the era of “building crony 
capitalism” (Yekelchik: 2007, 250) — is eloquently reflected in the words of architects hired 
by the former government to rebuild the square. When discussing the reconstruction of the 
Maidan, Sergey Babushkin, businessman and main Kyiv architect from 1996 to 2003, said 
that the square and especially its subterranean areas had massive potential as a commercial 
and entertainment complex. He also noted that both Ukrainian and foreign investors were 
enlisted in order to rebuild the square and construct a shopping mall, adding  that the 
possibility of using the Khreschatyk to earn money should serve as a motivating factor for 
citizens.  Babushkin himself is scandalously known for his involvement in illegal 53
construction and criminal property takeovers in Kyiv.  Thus, the  small protest that  was 54
52 Tyshchenko, “Maidan: vid prostoru protestu…,” 98; Henri Lefebvre, ​The Production of Space 
(Oxford UK; Cambridge, Mass: Blackwell, 1991), 165. 
 
53 Sergei Babushkin, “Snova o Maidane” (“Again about Maidan”), ​A.C.C​. 4 (2002): 20. 
 
54 Tetyana Chornovil, “Shram na oblicchi Kieva (Scar on Kyiv’s face),” ​Livy Bereg​, June 3, 2011, 
accessed May 24, 2017, https://lb.ua/news/2011/06/03/99649_lavra.html. 
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unknown in Ukraine’s regions due to the absence of independent news media at the time (the 
internet was not yet widely used in Ukraine), was suffocated and rebranded as the 
government’s architectural “gift to the city,” the main agenda of which was entertainment and 
consumption.  
The commercialization of the public space as government strategy eclipsed the previous 
Soviet strategy of control and education of an ideologically “correct” collective  body using 
the public space as a tool. This commercialization generally reflects broader processes 
occurring throughout the nation: following in Russia’s footsteps early in the 1990’s, Ukraine 
passed a series of laws regarding the privatization of residential and government buildings. 
Groys ironically refers to this phenomenon as a new ideology: while the construction of a 
Communist society was brought about through mass collectivization, the building of a 
capitalist society is done in reverse – through mass privatization.  At the same time, the 55
protests mentioned above make it clear that beginning in the 1980s, grassroots movements 
have been regularly arising in Kyiv – protests which do not fit into any of the usual political 
categories and thus find themselves somewhere in between, struggling to articulate a social 
paradigm that does not yet exist. Starting with the Revolution of Granite, these protests 
attempt to establish a new “Ukrainian-ness” with democratic values at its core. In 2004, the 
Orange Revolution established the “occupational” nature of these protests and cemented the 
Maidan as a symbol of the public voice. 
With the outbreak of the protest events of 2013-2014 the Maidan square was quickly 
transformed into an extemporaneous town protected by improvised barricades made of 
debris, tires, sandbags, and paving stones (Fig. 23). One of the first articulated demands of 
protesters was for the right to use the city and its public places to assemble and express their 
55 Boris Groys, “Privatizations, or Artificial Paradises of Post-Communism,” in ​Art Power​, 165. 
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opinions freely, moreover, to be “politically present and visible” in the city center.  This also 56
meant claiming their right to define the agenda of the space; since the early 2000s they had 
been limited to a passive consumption of goods or entertainment due to the vast 
commercialization of the area. Moreover, as the protest expanded in response to police 
attacks, the protester claimed access to the administrative buildings of the center and 
occupied them one by one—Kyiv City State Administration, House of Unions, October 
Palace, and Ukrainian House—to make places for rest, soup-kitchens, medical centers, etc. 
Yet, the Maidan did not have a coordinator at large; it grew as a rhizome, with self-organized 
initiatives defined by what was important for a particular group. 
Remarkably, the Ukrainian House (former Lenin Museum) became an exemplary case 
of pluralism in  public life. Numerous communities (“feminist hundred,” “creative hundred,” 
“student hundred,” Open University, Open Library, etc) self-organized there and collaborated 
to vocalize their agenda by means of arts and information. The distribution of resources 
within the Ukrainian house (the Maidan in general was supported by people who could either 
bring goods or donate to the initiative/location they prefered) and its administration occurred 
through the grassroots self-rule of “gromada of Ukrainian house.” The very place that housed 
the giant Lenin statue was now an improvised movie theater with an ongoing program of 
documentaries and lectures regarding issues of human rights; the House welcomed all the 
citizens with the banner “The space that is free from discrimination” (Figs.24-25). In the case 
of the Maidan, such a re-appropriation of public space, in which plurality of social life and 
thought manifested itself through means of creative expression and forms of cooperation in 
the city, became a country-wide phenomenon that signalled a paradigm shift in popular 
engagement with social and political issues. The fully functioning and diverse entity of the 
56 Tyshchenko, “Maidan: vid prostoru protestu…,” 98. 
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Maidan formed a background for the emergence of a public sphere in the Habermasian sense 
—as a place where citizens could assemble and unite, express and publicize their opinion 
freely, and  as a regulatory institution against the authority of the state. 
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Chapter III: Shadows of ‘Vozhd’ 
By rendering an anti-Soviet narrative and emphasizing the danger of the presence of 
monuments in the public sphere, Ukrainian officials have followed the steps of their Soviet 
predecessors, who believed that public space had primarily didactic and patronizing 
functions. The idea that “Sovietness” is threatening Ukraine’s sovereignty and that the 
promotion of “Ukrainian” values will advance the process of democratization may merely 
substitute the content of propaganda without either questioning the relevance of the method 
in a contemporary context or reckoning with the cultural makeup of Post-Soviet Ukraine. 
Moreover, the drastic ban of Soviet monumental art, together with the renaming of cities and 
streets and attempts to make existing monuments and their empty pedestals look more 
“Ukrainian” neither responds to the Maidan’s anti-establishment motives, nor advances the 
vision of Ukraine as a country with democratic values. Thus, the question this chapter 
considers is whether the decommunization process initiated by the new government after the 
revolution reflects the grassroots approach towards public space demonstrated during the 
protest as a means to open discussion and fostering community engagement. Given that since 
the collapse of the USSR, Ukrainians would barely pay attention to political or commercial 
imagery encountered in public space, another question emerges: was the Soviet idea of 
educating the masses relevant in the post-Soviet context, and to what extent was it effective 
even in its own  time? To answer these questions, the chapter focuses on the three Lenin 
monuments within the administrative center and then on the post-Maidan artistic 
interventions at the site of the Lenin monument at Bessarabska Square.  
Lenins of Maidan and What We Learned from Them  
The previous chapter introduced the idea of the USSR as a Gesamtkunstwerk, whose 
duty was to shape the collective body by influencing people's consciousness. In the case of 
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Kyiv’s administrative center, the construction and transformation of which was also analyzed 
above, the ideological function was partially embedded in the omnipresence of Lenin figures 
that “guarded” the three squares — Bessarabska, October Revolution, and Lenin Komsomol. 
Moreover, within this short stretch of the city center, there was also a street bearing Lenin’s 
name, the Lenin memorial desk on ЦУМ (TsUM — Central Universal Department Store), 
and the Lenin Museum on Vladimirska street (later moved to Lenin Komsomol Square). The 
dense concentration of Lenin’s presence in a relatively small area meant to signify the 
importance of the “leader” and saturate the urban space with Soviet mythology. However, if 
one leaves aside the idea of a collective psyche propagated by official Soviet culture, the 
impact that the built environment of Kyiv’s center has had on individuals is questionable. 
 To deconstruct the individual impact of  the Soviet myth-makers’ mass education 
efforts, I conducted a series of interviews with Soviet citizens of different generations and 
social strata: those who were exposed to Soviet history as contemporaries or as researchers, 
those who had worked with the locations or monuments in question, and those who had 
somehow interacted with them because the Gesamtkunstwerk of Soviet routine was simply 
unavoidable. My key questions were as follows: Were there any jokes or unusual stories 
about the three monuments? How did the interviewees or their peers perceive the public 
space of the Maidan and nearby squares with Lenin monuments? Did public space in the 
administrative center have a didactic effect or other specific impact on them?  The various 57
responses revealed some interesting observations and a certain discrepancy between the 
authoritarian intent behind the use of public space and its results in practice. 
57 Starting in April, 2017, I first began emailing questions to 11 Ukrainian professionals working in the 
arts, which led to several extended interviews via email and Skype; later on, I posted the same 
questions on my Facebook page, resulting  in an ongoing survey that has had 98 responses to date. 
Approximately 20% of respondents were over 35 and thus had direct memories of Soviet life, while 
the rest shared stories told by their parents and grandparents.  
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The question related to jokes resulted in a collection of jokes and humorous 
anecdotes, suggesting that at least some part of the USSR’s mythical collective body did not 
necessarily share in  the sacralization of the leader. There were plenty of comments regarding 
the shape of the monuments and buildings and their awkward artistic qualities. For example, 
the Lenin monument on Bessarabska square was called “a thermos” for the shape of its 
pedestal, and  the sculptural agglomerate beneath the back of the monument provoked ironic 
comments suggesting that Lenin was hiding or was ashamed of something. Moreover, 
Lenin’s hand was directed toward the Besarabsky market as if to say: “Everyone to the 
market.” The irony was that the entire county lived in a permanent condition of deficit and 
shortage; thus, the only stratum who could afford to buy food at Besarabsky market were 
Soviet “apparatchiks”, and the resident housing in the square itself was reserved for KGB 
officers.  The monument to the October Revolution on Maidan was popularly called 58
“Gulliver in the Lilliput Land” because the Lenin statue was significantly bigger than four 
small bronze figures: the male worker, the female worker, the peasant, and the sailor (Fig. 2). 
The figure of Lenin dominated the composition and stood apart from the masses in size and 
in medium: his likeness was made of red granite, suggesting that he belonged to a different, 
transcendent mode of being. And the Lenin Museum on Stalin Square (the third Lenin statue 
was installed indoors) was oftentimes called “a coffer” or “saccharine with margarine” for its 
rectangular shape and inappropriate placement — a beloved ancient hill that had been a 
favorite promenade for Kyivans was leveled to make space for construction of the museum 
(Fig. 21).  There were also some anecdotal stories shared by respondents, for example, when 59
58 Interview with Olena Borimska, April 7, 2017. 
 
59 Tetyana Filevska, “Ukrayinsʹkyy dim Lenina: doslidzhennya istoriya odniyeyi dekomunizatsiyi” 
(“Ukarainian House of Lenin: Study on One Decommunization Story”), ​Platforma​, September 5, 2016, 
accessed May 25, 2017, 
http://reinvent.platfor.ma/ukrdim-vs-lenin/?_ga=1.213930001.789833299.1396943906​. 
Interviews with Olena Borimska and Tetyana Filevska, April 7 and 8, 2017, respectively. 
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kids somehow felt that their parents or grandparents “did not like Grandpa Lenin” even 
though Soviet people (even dissidents) generally avoided expressing their critique of the 
state.  60
None of these jokes would have been safe to say in public until the Perestrojka of  the 
1980’s, when the now famous “Soviet kitchens” became hotbeds of dissent and culture due to 
government control of public space. One of the respondents, art historian Olena Borimska, 
shared a number of stories about when she and her peers had approached Soviet monuments 
under construction to ask basic questions, to inquire about some historical information 
regarding Lenin, or simply to observe, only to be detained for “abnormal behavior.” 
Borimska explained that Kyiv’s intelligentsia understood the absurdity of the political 
propaganda embodied by the large number of Lenin figures and mythology everywhere, but 
learned to live by double standards: to be quiet and follow the rules in public spaces, and 
curse the government in their kitchens. Borimska concluded that other Soviet generations and 
her own can identify with one another through this idea of not taking actions further than the 
kitchen-critique of the state. The Maidan and its protest town with open dialogues and 
discussions served as a sort of expansion of the 'kitchen critique space' into an occupied 
public space, thus, signalling a paradigm change from totalitarian to democratic.  
While commenting on the spatial impression of the squares, administrative center 
buildings, and monuments, аrt historian Tetyana Filevska spoke about the horror and 
oppression that one would feel in such places because of their sheer scale and dominance. 
She described her feelings when she visited the President’s Administration (a part of the 
administrative center) for the first time: 
... You just feel this pressure physically, you are lost in endless corridors, you feel 
some strange security behind these walls, as if you can do everything and you will not 
60 Dmitrii Gorbachev, cited by Tetyana Filevska in her email response, April 8, 2016. 
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get any punishment—no one can reach you. I often see how normal people are 
changing while working there. Those secret underground tunnels, the power hierarchy 
embedded in buildings and streets, overindulgence of power—all this still directly 
affects our society. The reconstruction of Khreshchatyk in the 1950s was an ideal 
embodiment of the Stalinist ideology. All the historically important sites of other 
epochs—Sofia, Lavra—were blocked ... Stalin ordered to block the view of all the 
churches from Khreshchatyk and Maidan. 
 
The “Gulliver” Lenin evoked similar feelings. The monument dominated the square so much 
that it exerted a quite literal “suffocating” influence over the surrounding space, its grandiose 
mass towering over every person who happened to pass through the square, to the extent that 
people did not want to spend their time on that part of Maidan and would often prefer to meet 
and walk across the wide street of Khreschatyk instead. Due to this overwhelming presence, 
the square was divided in two not only physically by the Khreschatyk but also symbolically – 
its “official” section surrounding the monument and the “unofficial”, everyday, human 
section on the opposite side.  Similar responses addressed the interior of the Lenin Museum, 61
where the third monument used to stand. It was compared to a cemetery: a giant white marble 
sculpture standing in an atrium, the quotes from Lenin’s manuscripts surrounding the space, 
flowers always near the sculpture. It was an “idol in the well” — the space was always 
empty, horrifying and paralyzing— as Borimska stated, “one would not even want to move 
inside that hall” (Fig. 26). Yet, most respondents did not recall negative feelings regarding 
the space of Kyiv’s center, and two even noted that for them it was a “normal and well 
planned architectural ensemble” that evoked the “feeling of security.” Gallerist Evgen Karas, 
however, concluded that one could not fully comprehend the influence of the architecture and 
monuments while they stood — it was only after their demolition that one could feel the 
61 Tyshchenko, “Maidan: vid prostoru protestu…,” 98. 
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“cancerous” “white noise” was gone.   62
 ​However, some respondents suggested that most Soviet people never questioned or 
reflected on the ideology and its monumentalized vision in public space. Borimska assumed 
that this was not only achieved through the persecution of intellectuals and the overall idea 
that thinking, as opposed to working, was “social parasitism,” but also through better 
treatment (both rhetorical and financial) of workers and through the encouragement to drink 
alcohol after work, so that the workers could “relax and not ask questions.” For many 
individuals who would neither critique nor glorify the state, the three Lenin monuments 
served as “landmarks” in the course of their lifetime. Even though it was the party who had 
decided that communist leaders, the revolution, and WWII were to be  commemorated on 
every occasion, for individuals, photos taken near Lenin monuments maintained memories  of 
all important life events—an initiation into Komsomol, a graduation day, a wedding, etc. 
(Figs. 27-28). That is, photographing these rituals became a mirror, in which people saw 
nothing but their youth and happy moments, something they wanted to remember.  Two 63
respondents mentioned that either they or their parents had proposed marriage near the Lenin 
monument; thus, its presence remained connected to a very personal memory. Another 
respondent, Oxana Grishyna, displayed a medal with the engraved “Gulliver” Lenin 
monument on the backdrop of the administrative center (Fig. 29)—such medals would be 
given to babies born in Kyiv together with their birth certificate (in a pink case if it was a girl, 
and a blue one for a boy). Grishyna said: “This was one of two first most important presents 
in my life. This medal and Ivan Kotlyarevsky’s ​Eneїda​, presented by my grandfather with the 
inscription about love to Ukraine. Ideology? No, this was a mark, a reminder that I was a 
62 Interview with Evgen Karas, May 5, 2017. 
 
63 Natalia Adamskaya, cited by Filevska in her email response, April 8, 2017. 
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native Kyivan.”  Alexey Shevchuk recalled a story of his grandfather, Georgii Lisitsya, 64
whose family was harshly repressed by the Stalinist regime and who “longed neither for the 
communist regime nor for Lenin,” yet who was against the demolishing of the monument 
because this is where he would come with his two daughters to commemorate Victory day 
and enjoy the parade on Khreshchatik— this place was significant for their history as a 
family. Remarkably, every other respondent was positive in their memories of parades and 
commemoration days, comparable to holidays, fun, and a sense of community.  
The destiny of the fallen monuments after the dissolution of the USSR demonstrates 
that commercial profit was more important that the communist myth. As soon as 
independence was announced in 1991, the “Gulliver” Lenin was vandalized with obscene 
words and swastikas (Fig.30). The Monument to the Great October Revolution was soon 
demolished according to a decision by KCSA and taken to the yard of the Republican 
Association "Ukrrestavratsiya"—since the organization was privatized in the early 90s, the 
location of the monument was unknown. The situation with the monument at the Lenin 
Museum was even more telling. In 1993 when the museum was liquidated (it was later 
renamed as Ukrainian House), the statue was smashed with jackhammers at night. This statue 
was made of a special very expensive marble—a cool shade with high luminosity. Such 
marble, one without  cracks, was chosen because “the leader has no flaws.”   The precious 65
stone was quietly and without  authorization transported to the same factory where it was 
produced, and the workers who dismantled it are still secretly selling off the pieces today. 
The last Lenin — the one on Besarabsky Market was standing until the recent revolution, 
when it was toppled by the crowd and smashed with hammers. Pieces of it still occasionally 
64 Responses recorded in May, 2017. 
 
65 Filevska, interview. 
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appear on internet auctions. The cult of Lenin vanished quickly, as there were no longer 
“Komsomol meetings” or weekly “political information” hours in every institution ranging 
from primary schools to factories— no need for performative commitment to the Party. 
Instead, images of the previously untouchable figure of Lenin, and all sorts of communist 
memorabilia, when offered to tourists, became marketable sources of income. 
The weak ideological influence that the great myth of the USSR had exercised 
through the built environment of public space, architecture, and monuments was even less 
present in independent Ukraine. The remaining monuments and memorial sites—every 
square, park, or boulevard that had them incorporated into their design—would be 
automatically maintained, yet “invisible” both in professional and media discourse, as well as 
to the public. Aside from wreath-laying ceremonies commemorating WWII, or as part of 
official visit rituals, the only regular audiences at these sites were young skateboarders, 
attracted by spacious surfaces covered by granite flagstones suitable for riding. Remarkably, 
one of the prominent Ukrainian street artists, Vova Vorotniov, made a “Deckommunization 
series” in 2016, in which he documented the sites of the administrative center and its 
monuments “appropriated” by skateboarders (Figure 31). In a conversation about the 
decommunization process in Ukraine, the artist said that “the decommunization already 
happened in the mind of Ukrainians, who do not take these sites seriously, do not notice them 
on a daily basis, or appropriate them for other purposes.”  In this case, the young 66
skateboarders signify a Post-Soviet generation of Ukrainians because skateboarding culture 
came to Ukraine in the 1990’s, with the “westernization” of the Post-USSR countries.  
66 Vova Vorotniov in the panel discussion “Falling Lenins: Decommunization in Ukraine through the 
Lens of Art,” at the Jordan Center for the Advanced Studies of Russia at NYU, December 9, 2016, 




Thus, the ideological influence on people through public space and monumental art 
was a constructed idea that was not entirely effective. While in the USSR it was impossible to 
express publicly the criticism of power or its embodiment in monistic images, in post-Soviet 
Ukraine, people typically did not care about any unified idea being embodied in public space. 
The emergence of occupational protest practices and, in particular, the Maidan—with its 
national scale and grassroot creative expression— is evidence that among Ukrainians there is 
a growing need to use public space as a place for communication of values ​​related to the 
needs of people, not power. However, the initiators of large-scale decommunization continue 
to articulate the idea that the presence of Soviet symbols is a hindrance to "Ukrainian 
identity." Attempts to remodel monuments by decorating them with traditional Ukrainian 
elements or by covering them with the Ukrainian flag, as well as the replacing Soviet leaders 
with figures from Ukrainian history or Orthodox religion, propagate the politics of fixed 
identities and do not respond to contemporary visions of public space. In the following 
section, I narrow my focus to the post-Maidan situation at the site of the Lenin monument on 
Bessarabska Square to analyze grassroots creative initiatives and the reconceptualization of 
public space. 
Inhabiting the Pedestal 
Since the protest waves of the revolutionary Maidan washed away the last Lenin of 
Kyiv, its pedestal has been standing empty, open to interventions and internet memes. 
Objects, flags, or inscriptions appear without sanction, manifest themselves for a couple of 
hours, and are quickly removed by the city administration. Among  them have been a golden 
toilet (an anonymous ironic reference to the corrupt regime of the former president, whose 
palace was mocked for its kitschy opulence), an installation made of a hundred plastic 
mannequins painted gold, and a psychedelic garden sculpture figure of the Virgin Mary (Figs. 
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32-35). Be it a monument to Jedi Master Yoda or a toilet made of gold, what is common to 
all of these interventions are the irony and fearless occupation of public space in contrast to 
the restrictive and almost sacralized Soviet approach to the monuments. 
It is against this background the first fully institutionally developed artistic project, 
Cynthia Gutierrez’s temporary installation​ Inhabiting Shadows ​(2016)​, ​was installed there by 
the charitable art foundation IZOLYATSIA: Platform for Cultural Initiatives as a part of the 
“Social Contract” project (July 2016—ongoing) (Fig.4). ​Inhabiting Shadows, ​an art 
installation built over the pedestal that once held Kyiv’s last Lenin monument, was made as a 
scaffolding with stairs allowing viewers to climb on top of the postament. Born in 
Guadalajara, Mexico, Cynthia Gutierrez, whose submission was selected among twenty one 
applications from artists and art collectives around the globe (eight from Ukraine, two from 
Mexico, and one each from Poland, Bulgaria, Chile, Spain, Belgium, Latvia, Thailand, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Netherlands, and Switzerland), had in her previous work addressed 
memory and oblivion, in limitations on and conflicts of spaces defined by their history.  67
The audience’s reaction to the work is especially significant as it indicates not only 
the pluralization of public opinion and Kyivans’ engagement in the debate about public 
space, but also reveals a confusion when it comes to a critical discussion on public art. 
Inhabiting Shadows​ triggered a massive conversation on Facebook (which became an 
important type of public space in Ukraine during the revolution). Comments on the popular 
Club of Native Kyivans Facebook group (approx. 120), posts with the hashtag (approx. 200), 
67 The ​Inhabiting Shadows​ installation was selected by an international jury consisting of: Anna 
Bondar, interim director of the Department for Urban Planning and Architecture of the Kyiv City State 
Administration (Ukraine); Evgeniya Kuleba – co-founder of the Heavenly Hundred Garden, head of 
the Garden City project (Ukraine); Rick Rowbotham, architect, urban designer (UK); Oksana 
Barshynova, curator, head of the XX – XXI century art department at the Ukrainian National Art 
Museum (Ukraine); Kateryna Filyuk, curator of the Social Contract project (Ukraine – Netherlands); 
Cynthia Gutiérrez, interview by Anastasiia Gerasimova, “I am always in a search while working,” ​ART 
UKRAINE​, April 6, 2017, accessed May 25, 2017, 
http://artukraine.com.ua/eng/a/sintiya-guterres--ya-brosayu-vyzov-miru/#.WSuDPfrysdU. 
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and reactions to mass media coverage (approx. 25 publications) provided a general idea of 
how the work was accepted.  Gutierrez’s simple and meaningful idea led to an appreciation 68
of the work as something radically new to the city, but also provoked strong criticism among 
artistic circles and citizens, who voiced  opinions that the project was “horrible” and had 
“raped the city.” Critics’ arguments were generally related either to aesthetics or to ideology. 
For instance, journalist Anna Parovatkina believed that the work was not beautiful or even 
“ugly,” that the construction was not visually connected to the Besarabsky market’s building, 
or that its ugliness highlighted the decline of the city and  did not popularize contemporary 
art.  Others expressed the view that it did not connote the past presence of Lenin or the 69
history of recent years, or that not everybody deserved to stand on the pedestal. And a few 
questioned the procedure behind the installation of the work and blamed IZOLYATSIA or 
KCSA for monopolization of decisions regarding public space. 
Thus, beyond the public’s desire to communicate its ideas through public space, the 
broad negative reaction signifies the absence of a common language to analyze and 
appreciate public art works. For decades, monumental art had served as a way to strengthen 
the political agenda, and the significance of the monumentalized figure had never been 
publicly questioned. In this light, Gutierrez’s project marked the current understanding of 
how public art functions and emphasized the shifting paradigm of popular engagement with 
monumental art. While public art in Ukraine had been the government’s prerogative—the 
reason why the audience was rather confused and lacked a proper consensus on how to 
discuss it—it had emerged in Western countries as a separate category in the discipline of art 
68 Asia Bazdyrieva, “Z vysoty p'yedestalu” (“From the Height of the Pedestal”), ​KORYDOR​, July 12, 
2017, accessed May, 25, 2017, ​http://www.korydor.in.ua/ua/bez-rubriki/inhabiting-shadows.html​. 
I followed the audience’s responses on June 9-11, 2016 for my article about Gutierrez’s work. 
  
69 ​Anna Parovatkina’s comment on Viktor Marushchenko’s Facebook post, July 10, 2016. 
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history. In interpreting ​Inhabiting Shadows​ as a marker of the pluralization of thought, the 
following section borrows Western methodology and deconstructs the work by analyzing it 
through three key factors: temporality, site-specificity, and patronage. 
The formal analysis of ​Inhabiting Shadows​ helps to contextualize it within the Soviet 
tradition of monumentalizing the verticality of power. The work is composed of a 
conventional metal scaffolding staircase ascending and descending the pedestal where Lenin 
statue once stood. The entire construction is almost transparent, but one can see that its shape 
resembles a Mexican pyramid or a Mesopotamian ziggurat—an ancient monumental structure 
that was a source of inspiration for the totalitarian aesthetics of the twentieth century in 
Europe. Climbing a ziggurat (a Babylonian word meaning “to build on a raised area”) 
symbolically signifies the higher position of the one who has climbed it and his special 
closeness to God, or even suggests that one has replaced God. In fact, the latter might be seen 
as a reference to the USSR, where the cult of leaders required almost sacred worship and 
essentially replaced the religion that had been eliminated by the Party. The Communist 
regime had religious overtones from the start with the cult of Lenin and the Bolsheviks’ 
striving for a ‘​vozhd​’, whose personal leadership was critical of the movement. Despite the 
emancipatory potential of the revolution, it relied heavily on a ‘traditional peasant mentality’ 
developed through monarchist respect to personal authority “whether it emanated from 
immediate boss or from the head of the party and state.”  This culminated with the drastic 70
emergence of Joseph Stalin's cult of personality after a lavish celebration of Stalin's 50th 
birthday in December 1929.  The Soviet press presented Stalin as an all-powerful, 71
70 Robert C. Tucker, “The Rise of Stalin's Personality Cult,” ​The American Historical Review​ ​Vol. 84​, 
No. 2 (Apr., 1979): 347. 
 
71 Graeme Gill, "The Soviet Leader Cult: Reflections on the Structure of Leadership in the Soviet 
Union", ​British Journal of Political Science​ ​10​ (1980): 167. 
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all-knowing leader, and Stalin's name and image became omnipresent; cities, villages, 
collectives, schools, factories, and institutions were named after him (as after Lenin). From 
1936, Soviet journalism started to refer to Joseph Stalin as the Father of Nations; enormous 
portraits of Lenin and Stalin were, like icons, an integral part of massive demonstrations and 
public space in general. As described in Chapter II, these idolized figures were visualized 
through colossal sculptures, detached from masses both in scale and material— be it the 
aforementioned Lenin on the Palace of Soviets or the one in the Maidan’s monument to the 
Great October Revolution, where the size difference between Lenin and the workers reached 
the aforementioned comic proportions.  
Gutierrez chose the method of deconstruction to create a moment for contemplating 
history with all its ambiguity. She offered every passerby the opportunity to climb up; to 
occupy the patch where Lenin’s figure stood for the sixty-seven preceding years; to look at 
Bessarabska Square; to take a selfie; and, potentially, to think about who or what might or 
should occupy this place and why. By being so inclusive—the audience literally  becomes 
part of the composition—the artist makes visible the mechanism of an individual’s 
participation in the process of constructing history. The viewers’ experiences vary: one 
person might easily climb up out of curiosity regarding the urban landscape, another person 
could be horrified to be standing in a place that served as a gallows during the Second World 
War, while a third might be amused by the power of the place and begin to imagine him- or 
herself as a leader, hero, or prophet, confirming the idea that individuals rapidly adopt social 
roles according to a given position. For one person, such as the pensioner Volodimyr, who 
brought a Ukrainian flag, that was a moment of triumph— “I am standing on Ukraine’s past,” 
he said—whereas for his partner, Lyudmila, the moment was full of nostalgia as she recalled 
giving an oath at the spot as a young Soviet pioneer. There is an endless combination of 
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personal experiences and choices, and this plurality is a direct reference to democratic society 
and its diversity. Thus, the meaning of the work emerges out of these acts of inclusion, 
multiplying experiences and breaking down the monolithic imagery of “history,” “hero,” and 
“identity.” This uncomplicated collapsible construction gains symbolic value in showing the 
possibility of applying the same collapsible approach to the past, the shadows of which are 
more ambiguous than is generally allowed by the official discourse about Ukrainian identity. 
Yet another connection of this work to the Soviet artistic tradition reveals itself when 
examining Gutierrez’s work through the lens of Latin American conceptual art—a tradition in 
whose context the artist developed her practice in Mexico. The form originated from Mexican 
muralism of the first half of the twentieth century, similarly to the cultural paradigms of the 
early USSR. There is a surprising parallel between artistic processes in early-20th century 
Mexico and the Soviet avant-garde in the early years of the USSR, when artists such as 
Alexander Rodchenko, El Lissitzky, and their peers strongly supported the Soviet project. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, for some time these avant-gardists believed that art should 
have an educational function and improve the taste of the proletariat, yet the Soviet 
authorities quickly appropriated artistic methods for disseminating propaganda instead of 
knowledge.  A similar context motivated Mexican artists to abandon the practice of 72
muralism, which had become a means of government-commissioned propaganda, and turn 
instead to creating non-material, non-object art. One of the characteristics of such art was 
didacticism.  The educational potential of art is, indeed a significant component of 73
Inhabiting Shadows​, nonetheless it remains a friendly didacticism that offers an egalitarian 
72 ​Benjamin H. D. Buchloh,  “From Faktura to Factography.” ​October 30​, (Autumn, 1984): 82 – 119. 
 
73 Luis ​Camnitzer, “The Markers of Latin American Conceptualism” in ​Conceptualism in Latin 
American Art Didactics of Liberation​ (University of Texas Press, 2007): 153 — 161. 
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approach by facilitating critical conversation. In a Facebook discussion about the work, the 
project curator, Kateryna Filiyk, also underlined the conceptual, formative aspect of the 
piece: 
One should not treat the work as an object....It was necessary to emphasize its 
temporary nature, openness to different interpretations. And the scaffolding is a good 
solution because you always erect it in order to build something new. Since there is 
still no consensus on what will replace the current pedestal, we are stopping at this 
preparatory stage and inviting all who are interested to join the process of discussion. 
The most important thing is to enable the construction to engage people, their 
movement, their feelings. The stairs are not the art object, not a final product; they are 
only a tool.  74
 
Instead of giving viewers a predesigned set of meanings for passive contemplation, 
Gutierrez’s conceptual, non-object-oriented work, offers a DIY toolkit for the creation of 
meaning. 
Site Specificity  
The specificity of this particular place at Bessarabska has many layers, some of which 
have been indirectly addressed earlier. Firstly, this is the place where “Leninfall” began, thus 
giving rise to the government’s decommunization program, as well as sparking a broader 
discussion about its relevance and seducing artists and creative passersby with its empty 
pedestal. Historical information about the place discloses its even broader ambiguity. 
According to ​Istorychna Pravda​, at the time of the Nazi occupation, the site of the former 
monument was a place of public execution where Germans hanged hostages on the boulevard 
lamps and forced Kyivans to watch the process.  There is also a rumor that after winning the 75
war, the Soviet militants hung Ukrainians who had fought against the Soviet government for 
the independence of Ukraine. Such a layering of historical contexts  suggests that history is 
74 Kateryna Filiyk, comment on Viktor Marushenko’s Facebook post, July 10, 2016. 
 
75 “Istoriia pam’’atnyka Leninu v Kyievi,” ​Istorychna Pravda​, December 9, 2013, accessed December 
18, 2016, http://www.istpravda.com.ua/articles/2013/12/9/140323/. 
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rather conflicting and does not fit into a singular framework. Even its title, ​Inhabiting 
Shadows​ addressed this multiplicity of possible historical narratives.  
In response to comments that the work did not fit with the urban landscape 
(particularly the Besarabsky Market building in front of it), it is also possible to argue that the 
aesthetic component, as partially demonstrated in the above analysis, shows visual 
forethought and specificity to the site. Just as the Lenin monument was visually coherent with 
the seemingly endless narrow boulevard behind it, framed by the two rows of peaked poplars, 
Inhabiting Shadows​ was in dialogue with the preceding monument both visually and 
conceptually: the eternal prospects of the Socialist future, unfolding under guidance of the 
vozhd​, were now replaced with the narrow ladder, a passage that everybody could come and 
go through, embodying the essence of time (and history) as a constant flow of changing 
events and figures. This successful grasping of historical context gives the work a coherent 
meaning that  allows it to deconstruct the idea of a single historical perspective. 
Temporality  
Temporary public art projects became popular in the U.S. in the late 1980s and early 
90s. In her article “Temporality and Public Art”—one of the first texts about the emerging 
practice—art historian Patricia Phillips argued the importance of temporary art projects for 
local communities. Phillips suggests that the construction of permanent monuments requires 
the consideration of many factors that are simply impossible to collect, examine, and 
combine in one work. Therefore, any permanent work is a “grand solution,” which represents 
the decision or interest of a specific person or ideology.  Instead, temporary work is more 76
open to experimentation because the same space can serve as a platform and a background 
for the creation of many works, each of which addresses different issues and acknowledges 
76 Patricia C. Phillips, “Temporality and Public Art,” ​Critical Issues in Public Art ​(Winter, 1989): 331. 
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different viewers and contexts. Phillips argues, that temporary projects, deploy a field 
laboratory for the production of a plethora of experiences—aesthetic or intellectual—and it is 
the temporal aspect of the work that allows experimentation with decisions that may not 
necessarily end up being “good” ones: 
A temporary public art may not offer broad proclamations; it may stir controversy and 
rage; it may cause confusion; it may occur in nontraditional, marginal, and private 
places. In such an art the conceptual takes precedence over the more obvious 
circumstantial.  77
 
As opposed to massive Soviet monuments designed to set the communist truth in stone for 
eternity, ​Inhabiting Shadows​, an ephemeral work that lasted only two weeks, was indeed a 
laboratory for generating experiences ranging from the contemplation of the problematic past 
to simple entertainment, thus for laying the groundwork for acknowledging the diversity of 
Ukrainian society.  
Given that this particular place is so charged politically and historically, is it at all 
possible to find a grand solution that would have the capacity to represent all of 
contemporary Ukrainians in an old monumental tradition? Could there be a monument that 
takes into account the interests of all these groups? What would it be? What are its functions? 
What are the alternatives? The Maidan, which in many ways galvanized these questions, 
involved completely opposite political views ranging from anarcho-communist to ultra right, 
not to mention the hundreds of people who could not identify themselves politically but were 
outraged by violations of human rights; those who could be at the square when the revolution 
became a commoditized image they wanted to identify with; or those who were there to 
vocalize their desire to join the visa-free zone with the EU so they could leave Ukraine more 
easily. Clearly, a unified image of all those Ukrainians does not exist, yet the Institute of 
77 Ibid., 332. 
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National Memory is advancing the politics of fixed identities based on ethnic and religious 
grounds. At a time of rapid decommunization and the replacement of Soviet “grand 
solutions” with Ukrainian ones, ​Inhabiting Shadows​— and the “Social Contract” project at 
large, which to this date presented three temporary installations at the spot— signals an 
alternative mode of interaction with the public realm and promotes public art in its primary, 
popular sense by embracing people in all their diversity. Such a shift from a dominant single 
idea to a variety of ideas reflects the painful process of self-identification and transition from 
authoritarianism to democracy that is now taking place in Ukraine in particular. 
Patronage 
As opposed to the Soviet establishment, which sought to legitimize ideological 
decisions and actions through public art, “Social Contract” shifts the function of authorities to 
merely administrative ones. As the first work commissioned by a third party and authorized 
by KCSA to be installed at a site of such symbolic significance, ​Inhabiting Shadows ​both 
revealed the lack of an exact procedure of approval for temporary artworks proposed by 
independent institutions, and set an important precedent for forthcoming projects of that kind. 
According to Filiyk, the patron of the work, IZOLYATSIA, sent a number of official letters 
to the KCSA, which took more than two months to circulate between departments whose 
representatives claimed that “this was not their responsibility.”  After persistent 78
communication (the institution has provided a table with a detailed description of requests, 
names of departments and KCSA representatives, timeline, etc.), IZOLYATSIA got the 
necessary permission and proceeded with their commission. Such an example constitutes a 
direct contrast to authoritarian decisions “from above” regarding public space. 
Furthermore, “Social Contract” advances the grassroots movement of the Maidan, 
78 Private conversation with the curator, July 2016. 
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which claimed popular right to the city through the practice of occupation and appropriation 
of Kyiv’s public spaces, taken to the next level of constructing an independent functional 
democracy. Within the history of independent Ukraine, Kyiv City State Administration is an 
exemplary case of the drastic Soviet “power vs. people” dichotomy. Early in 2013, KSCA 
had employed special police units who brutally attacked journalists and civil activists in 
response to their attempt to be present at the city administration’s session to reveal the 
corrupted mechanisms of land redistribution by deputies.  During the Maidan, KSCA was 79
one of the very first state institutions occupied by protesters and reappropriated as shelters, 
soup-kitchen, and field hospital. “Social Contract” mediates the binary opposition between 
power and the people into a visible precedent of realization of civic initiative through the 
state apparatus. 
The process of selecting  an artwork for each new rendering of a temporary 
installation within “Social Contract” also demonstrates the acceleration of popular 
engagement with public space. For the first project (which resulted in ​Inhabiting Shadows​) 
IZOLYATSIA announced an open call for artists and involved a jury to make a selection; 
they followed the same mechanism for the second round (resulting in Mahmoud Bakhshi’s 
Endless Celebration​ (November, 2016) and also conducted a survey to collect audience 
responses to the work.  For the third round (resulting in Isa Carillo’s ​Ritual of Self-Nature 80
(May, 2017) the jury made a shortlist of four proposals and let the people choose one of them 
in an online vote. Such public involvement constitutes a dramatic difference with the official 
79 Tyshchenko, “Maidan: vid prostoru protestu...,” 100. 
 
80 The ​Inhabiting Shadows​ installation was selected by an international jury consisting of: Anna 
Bondar – interim director of the Department for Urban Planning and Architecture of the Kyiv City State 
Administration (Ukraine); Evgeniya Kuleba – co-founder of the Heavenly Hundred Garden, head of 
the Garden City project (Ukraine); Rick Rowbotham – architect, urban designer (UK); Oksana 
Barshynova – curator, head of the XX – XXI century art department at the Ukrainian National Art 
Museum (Ukraine); Kateryna Filyuk – curator of the Social Contract project (Ukraine – Netherlands). 
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strategy of decommunization. While “Social Contract”—even with its title—presupposes an 
invitation to participation and finding consensus, decommunization imposes bans and 
restrictions, and postulates that no social conversation is necessary for making decisions 
regarding public art.  81
Last but not least, IZOLYATSIA’s background and mission demonstrate its 
enthusiasm in galvanizing democratic processes. It is a non-profit non-governmental platform 
for contemporary culture founded in 2010 by a local businesswoman and philanthrope Lubov 
Mikhailova, on the site of a former insulation materials factory in Donetsk, Ukraine. It was 
one of the first institutions in Ukraine (and the first in its East) that focused on enhancing 
local communities by means of art and information, and the creation of artistic spaces, labs, 
and workshops for the development of creative industries; one of the first to host international 
art residencies with the goal of researching Donbass with and for locals. In June of 2014, the 
territory was seized by Russian-backed separatists (they later destroyed art-installations and 
labs, transforming the location into a military site and using the factory's basements to detain 
hostages), and the institution moved to Kyiv. Many displaced people from Donetsk, for 
whom the new location is now a meeting place, still refer to IZOLYATSIA as a place that 
changed their lives by giving the only cultural alternative to ordinary life in the depressed 
industrial region of Donbass. Within the last three years that have marked  Ukraine, 
IZOLYATSIA’s program gained an even greater reputation for grassroots involvement and 
providing a platform for conversations about human rights, identity, history, and their 
manifestation in artistic and public spaces. 
 
 
81 Explanatory note to the LAW OF UKRAINE “On the condemnation of the communist and national 
socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols.” 
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Conclusion 
By emphasizing the urgency of erasing all traces of the USSR from public space the 
current Ukrainian government is essentially upholding the Soviet idea that public space is 
crucial for construction of the collective psyche. Yet the analysis of Soviet attempts to write a 
political narrative by means of spatial organization of public space and monumental art, as 
well as the public’s reaction to them reveal that the strategy did not have the desired impact. 
Decades of numerous reconstructions and renamings of Kyiv’s central area demonstrate that 
public space mirrored various stages of Soviet history, from the utopian desire to create a new 
state, to the colossal attempt to construct a new cult, and, at last, the official necessity to 
merely toe the Party line and avoid repercussions rather than to fulfill a belief in the ideals of 
communism.  
The drastic gap between the manifestation of ideology in public spaces and the 
personal attitude of the late Soviet public, whose responses reveal little ideological 
engagement, demonstrate that spatial organization and public art have limited influence on 
people’s consciousness. Even though the central parts of Kyiv were designed following 
Haussmann’s principles, with the idea of wide open areas in which the masses are easy to 
shoot and to control, it did not prevent the Maidan from becoming a crucial place for 
generating anti-authoritarian protest actions and for the subsequent development of the public 
sphere. What historians now call the new Ukrainian subjectivity, new Ukrainian-ness, or the 
birth of civic society developed due to the presence and history of the particular square, 
which became a place where citizens claimed their right to assemble, unite, and express their 
opinions freely.  
It was this striving for democratic values and diversification of public life that 
constituted the opposition to the Soviet era of normalization and censorship. But the 
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post-Maidan debate regarding the protest movement became a subject for misrepresentation 
and nationalist manipulation, for which the Russian intervention in the course of Ukrainian 
politics and the strong anti-colonial sentiment among right-wing politicians provided fertile 
ground. Despite the reductionism of authorities, which narrows the current political, social, 
and cultural situation to a primarily nationalist agenda, the examples of recent public art in 
Kyiv signal the diversification  of social life in a public space that is becoming a place for 
communication and community engagement. The case of the first temporary project, 
Inhabiting Shadows​, commissioned by an independent art foundation for the site of the 
former Lenin monument, demonstrates both Kyivans’ growing involvement in the discussion 
about public space and the lack of critical tools for generating a productive dialogue. 
Nonetheless, placing  the work in its historical context and analyzing its temporality, 
site-specificity, and patronage suggest that a democratic approach to public space is emerging 
in opposition to the authoritarian one, and that the demand for “popular” or truly public art, 
i.e. that which is available for public participation and contribution, constitutes an alternative 
to the old totalitarian model of using public space as a dominant vehicle for state propaganda.  
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Epilogue 
Almost three years after the Revolution of Dignity, Kyiv’s public sphere oscillates 
between propaganda and indifference, with the intensified commercialization and patriotic 
decoration of public space accompanied by public reactions ranging from  appreciation to 
rejection. Since the implementation of decommunization laws, some monuments were 
destroyed on site, some were covered with Ukrainian flags, and others were slightly 
vandalized, thus losing their status of protected heritage and allowing for their further 
demolition. In parallel, KSCA commissioned dozens of murals that cover Soviet 
tower-blocks with traditional Ukrainian motifs, heroic or patriotic imagery, or simply with 
apolitical colorful drawings, which many Kievans find a beautiful and appropriate change to 
the grey post-Soviet urban landscape. The Institute of National Memory has played a major 
role in advancing the anti-Soviet narrative and a general conservative course: Vyatrovych’s 
last initiative to date is a new law that eliminates a number of national holidays (including 
International Women’s Day and International Worker’s Day) and substitutes them with 
Mother’s Day, Defender’s Day, and Family Day— all of which reinvent tradition through the 
model of patriarchal society. Even though March 8 and May 1 did not originate in the USSR 
and their agenda has advanced human rights throughout the world, Vyatrovych insists on 
their “Sovietness” and thus their negative impact on the minds of Ukrainians. Given that 
within these three years Ukraine has lost territories and is still losing lives on a daily basis in 
the Russian-backed military conflict in the country’s East, the patriotic rhetoric and its 
embodiment in artistic forms is often justified and welcomed by Ukrainians, whereas critical 
discussion is rather marginal even in artistic and academic circles. The ongoing corruption 
and abuse of power multiplied by the deepening economic crisis have led to a mood of 
post-revolutionary despair claiming that the Maidan as a metaphor for the birth of the civic 
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society failed. The most exemplary case of such frustration was Davis Chichkan’s exhibition 
“Lost Opportunity,” which expressed the Maidan’s failure, and which was in the end  brutally 
destroyed by unknown right-wing vandals.  
At the same time, the public sphere of Kyiv is birthing and witnessing a number of 
initiatives—from individual artistic projects to relatively massive “marches of equality” and 
intense discussions on Facebook (still an important part of public sphere since the Maidan)— 
that advance the pluralism of social life. Speaking of such initiatives, as this epilogue is being 
written, the empty pedestal of the Lenin monument on Bessarabka Square is undergoing the 
next episode of the “Social Contract” project— ​Ritual of Self-Nature​ by Isa Carillo, who 
covered the granite postament with rosemary plants, known for their healing capacities, as a 
way of neutralising the ideological tension around the vacant pedestal (Fig. 36). In a way, the 
work serves as its own  epilogue to the thesis: as opposed to the Soviet project of disrupting 
the individual’s link with nature in order to create artificial social constructs, the installation 
metaphorically resumes the connection. Yet it does not offer new heroes, avoiding the very 
idea of given narratives and “grand solutions.” It simply invites people to acknowledge their 
history and calmly meditate on their surroundings. At the end of the project, the rosemary 





Figure 1. Sergey Merkurov, Monument to Vladimir Lenin, 1946. Sculpture, red Karelian 
stone, 11.32 ft. Photograph: 1960, Courtesy Tetyana Filevska. 
 
Erected on Bessarabska Square (Khreshchatyk Street at the intersection with Taras 
Shevchenko Boulevard) on 5 December 1946. Toppled from its pedestal and crushed on 
December 8, 2013. 
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Figure 2. V.Boroday, V.Znoba, I.Znoba; architects: A.Malinovsky, A.Skibitskiy, ​Monument 
of the Great October Socialist Revolution​, 1977. Sculpture, 60ft total. Courtesy Tetyana 
Filevska. 
 
The monument had a form of a granite pylon with a figure of Vladimir Lenin out of red 
granite (29 ft). In front of the pylon there were four bronze figures of male and female 







Figure 3. V. Borisenko, Monument to Vladimir Lenin in the interior of Lenin Museum, 1982.  
Sculpture, marble. Photograph: Viktor Marushchenko, 1984, Courtesy Tetyana Filevska. 
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Figure 4. Cynthia Gutierrez​, Inhabiting Shadows, ​2016​. ​Installation, metal scaffolding 
staircase, 20.7 x 4.92 x 45.6 ft. Photograph by Valery Miloserdov, Courtesy 
IZOLYATSIA.Platform for Cultural Initiatives.  
 
 






Figures 6-7. All-Union Competition, Administrative Center in Kyiv: 
Valerian Rykov architecture group submission, Kyiv, 1935 (top); 
Dmitry Chechulin and Georgy Orlov submission, Moscow, 1935 (bottom). 






Figures 8-10. All-Union Competition, Administrative Center in Kyiv (top to bottom): 
Ivan Fomin group submission, Moscow, 1935; Viktor and Aleksandr Vesnin brothers, 
Moscow, 1934; K. Alabyan’s submission, Moscow, 1935.  




Figure 11. All-Union Competition, Administrative Center in Kyiv 
Winning project, authored by I.Langbard, 1935. Reproduced from ​Architecture of Soviet 
Kyiv​, 2010. 
 
Figure 12. All-Union Competition, Reconstruction of Khreshchatyk 
 Final desicion (mix of all), 1958 Reproduced from ​Architecture of Soviet Kyiv​, 2010. 
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Figure 13. Maquette for the post-war reconstruction of Khreshchatik with the Maidan square 
at the center, Besarabska square at far right and Stalin square far left. Reproduced from 












Figure 17: Lenin Museum in Kyiv, designed by Valentin Gopkalo, 1980s. Central State G.S. 










Figures 19. A barricade on Institutska street during the Maidan protest in 2013-2015. 
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Figure 21. Open University at the Ukrainian House (former Lenin Museum) during the 
Maidan protest, 2014. 
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Figures 22. Interior of Lenin Museum, 1988. Photograph: V.O. Samokhotsky. Central State 
G.S. Pshenychnyy CinePhotoPhono Archives of Ukraine, Kyiv. 
 
 
Figures 23-24. Photos from Tetyana Filevska’s and Bohdan Gdal’s family archives 
respectively, approx. 1987-88. 
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Figure 25. A medal with Lenin engravement, 1969. Courtesy Oxana Grishyna, 2017. 
 
 




Figure 27. Vova Vorotniov, ​Deckomunnization​ series, 2016. Photo, dimensions variable. 




Figures 28-31. Unauthorized artistic interventions (​left to right​): ​Golden Toilet​ (anonymous); 
Determination​ (Tetyana Voitovich); ​Rise of Mary​ (Yanka Bachynska); internet meme— at 










Figure 32. Isa Carillo, ​Ritual of Self-Nature​, 2017. Installation, rosemary plants, soil, 
dimensions variable. Photograph by Valery Miloserdov, Courtesy IZOLYATSIA.Platform 




Excerpt from the LAW OF UKRAINE “On the condemnation of the communist and national 
socialist (Nazi) regimes, and prohibition of propaganda of their symbols” 
 
4) symbols of communist totalitarian regime – symbols, which contain: 
a. any image of state flags, coats of arms and other symbols of the USSR, 
Ukrainian SSR (USRR), other union or autonomous Soviet Republics of the 
USSR, the so-called “people’s democracies”: People’s Republic of Albania 
(Socialist People’s Republic of Albania), People’s Republic of Bulgaria, 
German Democratic Republic, People’s Republic of Romania (Socialist 
Republic of Romania), Hungarian People’s Republic, Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic, Federative People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (Socialist Federative 
Republic of Yugoslavia) and socialist republics in its composition, except 
those which are effective (valid) flags or coats of arms of the countries; 
b. anthems of the USSR, Ukrainian SSR (USRR), other union or autonomous 
Soviet republics or their fragments; 
c. flags, symbols, images or other attributes reproducing the combination of a 
sickle and a hammer, a sickle, a hammer and a five-pointed star, a plough, a 
hammer and a five-pointed star; 
d. symbols of the communist party or its elements; 
e. images, monuments, memorial signs, inscriptions dedicated to the persons, 
who held key management positions in the communist party (office of District 
Committee Secretary and higher), the persons, who held key management 
positions in the higher governmental and management bodies of the USSR, 
Ukrainian SSR (USRR), other union or autonomous Soviet republics, regional 
public authorities and governing boards, cities of republican status, staff of 
Soviet state security service bodies of all levels; 
f. images, monuments, memorial signs, inscriptions dedicated to the events 
related to the communist party’s activities, exercising the Soviet authority over 
the territory of Ukraine or its individual administrative areas, persecution of 
fighters for independence of Ukraine in ХХ century (except the monuments 
and memorial signs related to resistance and driving the Nazi invaders from 
Ukraine or development of Ukrainian science and culture); 
g. representations of communist party’s slogans, quotations of the persons, who 
held key management positions in the communist party (office of District 
Committee Secretary and higher), the persons, who held key management 
positions in the higher governmental and management bodies of the USSR, 
Ukrainian SSR (USRR), other union or autonomous Soviet republics, regional 
public authorities and governing boards, cities of republican status (except the 
quotations related to the development of Ukrainian science and culture), staff 
of Soviet state security service bodies of all levels; 
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h. names of the regions, districts, settlements, districts of cities/towns, parks, 
boulevards, streets, alleys, descents, lanes, prospects, squares, embankments, 
bridges, other place names in settlements, names of enterprises, institutions, 
organizations, containing names or nicknames of the persons, who held key 
management positions in the communist party (office of District Committee 
Secretary and higher), the persons, who held key management positions in the 
higher governmental and management bodies of the USSR, Ukrainian SSR 
(USRR), other union or autonomous Soviet republics, regional public 
authorities and governing boards, cities of republican status, staff of Soviet 
state security service bodies, as well as names of USSR, Ukrainian SSR 
(USRR), other union or autonomous Soviet republics and their derivatives, 
names related to the communist party activities (including assemblies of the 
party), anniversaries of the October coup of 25 October (7 November) 1917, 
exercising of Soviet authority over the territory of Ukraine or its individual 
administrative territorial units, persecution of the fighters for independence of 
Ukraine in ХХ century (except the names related to the resistance and driving 





“On the condemnation of the communist and national socialist (Nazi) regimes, and 
prohibition of propaganda of their symbols,” ​Ukrainian Institute of National Memory​, 
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